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Abstract(
 
Social dynamics depend on the use of language. Therefore, when exploring the 
relationships between states in the system of development assistance, it is important to 
consider their discourses. Their analysis contributes to the understanding of why they 
choose certain strategies, engage in partnerships or support certain regimes, and revels 
differences and coherences between the discourse at a general level and the country 
level. This project studies the case of a major development agency, the Department 
For International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom and its role in 
Rwanda, a country that until recently used to be remembered for the 1994 genocide, 
and today is Africa’s poster child thanks to the its controversial leader Paul Kagame. 
The analysis of the DFID’s discourses for general policy and Rwanda evidence a 
discrepancy that is rooted in the approach that the Rwandan president has taken to 
democracy and freedom of speech, and its clash with the DFID’s general discourse of 
liberal democracy. 
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Problem&Area 
 
“We must and we do acknowledge that the world failed Rwanda at that time of 
evil. The international community and the United Nations could not muster the 
political will to confront it. The world must deeply repent this failure. … 
Rwanda’s tragedy was the worlds tragedy.”  (Annan, 2012, p. 74)  
 
These are the words of former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan in 1998 
in an address to the Rwandan parliament. It seems like the international community as 
a whole felt guilt for not being able to prevent or stop the genocide faster. It is not 
unreasonable to think that this is one reason why the United Kingdom’s Department 
for International Development (DFID) started Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) activities in Rwanda shortly after the genocide, while they had little activities 
in that country before the violence started.  
 
The United Kingdom (UK) is an interesting agent to look into, not only for their 
strong presence in Rwanda but also for being a key actor in development assistance. 
In fact, it has been recognised as “an international leader in development” by the 
OECD DAC Committee. 
 
“This is the result of the clear vision, consistent political leadership, strong 
human resource and financial capacity, and continued commitment to the 
2015 target of providing 0.7% of its gross national income (GNI) as official 
development assistance (ODA). [The UK] (…)“has taken a lead in a number 
of critical areas such as aid effectiveness, engagement in fragile states, 
humanitarian assistance and the reform of the international aid system. As a 
result, the UK is in many ways seen as a model by other donors. This gives the 
UK a special responsibility”.  (OECD, 2010) 
 
The UK’s overall frame for development assistance policy is reflected in different 
official documents such as White Papers, as well as country-specific strategies and 
programs. All of these documents reflect not only lines of action but also a political 
stance regarding the system of development assistance, aided countries, other actors 
in development such as states, and international financial organizations like the World 
! 3!
Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Consequently, words such as democracy, 
sustainable development, partnerships, globalisation, poverty reduction, stability, 
growth, and local ownership among others are being used frequently in the discourses 
of the DFID as a donor, but also by aided states, official institutions and NGOs alike.  
The DFID is no exception, as seen in the following quote extracted from the 
departments website, where they express the goals of British ODA, for example, to 
Rwanda: 
 
“We aim to help Rwanda’s development into a democratic, prosperous 
country, with good governance and respect for human rights, plying a 
responsible role in the region’s politics including in support of peacekeeping. 
In so doing, we seek to improve possibilities for UK trade and investment, 
supporting Rwanda’s own goal of becoming a middle income country.” 
(GOV.UK) 
 
This statement exemplifies the use of words within the discourse. In this case, it is the 
discourse that transmits British policy regarding Rwanda. Discourses can be powerful 
tools that explain the states’ actions and in turn and shape the reality. When put into a 
context, they can help us understand the logics behind dynamics of the system of 
development assistance and relationships between actors.  
 
“Words make worlds. The language of development defines worlds-in-the-
making, animating and justifying intervention in currently existing worlds with 
fulsome promises of the possible”  (Cornwall & Eade, 2010, p. 1) 
 
As words are that powerful, it is interesting to see how has the discourse of such an 
important actor as the DFID changed overtime within the global trends. In addition, 
how its discourse relates with a country like Rwanda in particular.  
 
Since it appeared after the Second World War, the development industry has adopted 
a language that is a reflection of the cultural mind-set of governments, institutes and 
organisations leading the system. The World Bank, IMF, United Nations and its 
agencies, as well as the DAC-OECD members with the respective development 
agencies dominate the discourse. Therefore the vocabulary employed by development 
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practitioners can vary significantly in different periods of time. In this project we aim 
at understanding a fraction of the reality by looking into these words. We lay focus on 
the DFID as a member of the aid system framed by the United Nations and the DAC-
OECD, and its role in Rwanda looking into discourses from 1997 to 2009. 
 
In present times Rwanda is often being highlighted as an example of good governance 
development with measurable results being made. This is supported by, for example, 
the former European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Louis 
Michel, in late 2013; “Rwanda’s track record on achieving the UN Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) are impressive, with targets met in almost all areas…”  
(Michel, 2013) Rwanda has performed exceptionally well compared to the rest of the 
African continent when it comes to reaching the 2015 Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG). According to the United Nations, Rwanda has achieved the following: 
• Reduced poverty by 12% between 2006 and 2011 
• Net primary school attendance reached 91.7 % in 2010-2011, and net 
secondary school attendance reached 20.9% the same year 
• The rate of the population with access to safe drinking water nationwide was 
74.2% in 2010-2011 
• Maternal mortality has dropped drastically from 1071 deaths per year in 2000 
to 487 in 2010 
• Under-5 mortality has dropped from 152 deaths per year in 2005 to 76 in 2010 
• HIV prevalence rate has been stable at 3% since 2005 
• The economy grew 8.8% in 2011 with an inflation rate at 8.3 %  (UNDP, 
2012) 
 
The post-genocide Rwanda has experienced a notable economic recovery and 
increase of the service sector along with a reduction of the agricultural sector, with an 
average economic growth of 8,1% per year between 2004 and 2012. The case of 
Rwanda is portrayed as a remarkable example of reconstruction as notorious 
achievements were made, and the president Paul Kagame is presented as the 
ideologue of a model with strong leadership, upwards accountability, delivering 
efficient governance and economic growth. Furthermore, the population living in 
poverty decreased from 59% in 2001 to 45% by 2011 (The Economist Intelligence 
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Unit, 2014). And not by coincidence, Paul Kagame is seen as the great leader, creator 
of the strategy that took the broken state of Rwanda and made it into “the biggest 
success story out of the African continent”  (Zakaria, 2009). This allowed Kagame to 
receive in turn, the support of the DFID and important political actors such as Tony 
Blair, philanthropists like Bill Gates or CEOs of big western companies such as 
Starbucks, Microsoft and Google among others, that are willing to engage in 
partnerships with him to contribute to the development of Rwanda.  
With the above-mentioned results Rwanda is covering many of the aspects addressed 
by Development words that are considered key in the current development dialogue to 
improve the situation of poor countries like Rwanda. In other words, the discourses 
used within the field of International Development Studies, in global and local 
policies on development assistance and not surprisingly, the DFID’s discourse in 
particular.   
 
Still, there are areas where Rwanda is not excelling. With an estimated population of 
around 11 million people, GDP of 6377 million US$ and a GDP per capita of 583 
US$ (UN, 2011) Rwanda remains as one of the poorest countries in the world and it is 
still highly dependent on agriculture. The first sector occupies people mainly for 
subsistence, and it is often unstable and with low productivity, affecting the majority 
of the population that lives in poverty in the rural areas. It will require a long-term 
sustained growth to take Rwanda out of this situation and not less important, to 
sustain it over time. The economic growth is highly dependent on Kagame’s 
leadership, as the economy of the country is in control of a small group of people, 
understandably Kagame’s supporters. The regime is applying a top-down 
coordination and control of the economy. But the control is not limited to the 
economy: 
“The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which has been in power since it 
halted the 1994 genocide, tightly controls political space, civil society and the 
media, contending that this is necessary to prevent renewed violence” 
(Ntaganda, 2011). 
In the 2009 the United Nations International covenant on civil and political rights 
published their concluding observations on Human rights in Rwanda. The Human 
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Rights Committee among other critical conclusion stated the following: 
“The State party should take the necessary steps to enable national human rights 
NGOs to operate without hindrance. It should treat all political parties on an 
equal footing and offer them equal opportunities to pursue their legitimate 
activities” (Human Rights Watch, 2009, p. 5) 
 
This statement and the rest of the report show that a lack of fundamental political and 
human rights that are essential in a democracy, as a wider political participation and 
the creation of conditions that improve the work of non-governmental organisations 
and civil participation. Friedman states, “While the Rwandan economy has 
blossomed, individual freedoms have not”  (Friedman, 2012, p. 256). 
Nonetheless, the problems related to democracy and freedom of speech does not seem 
to weaken the support of the British government to Kagame’s administration. Over 
the period 2011-2015, UK aid to Rwanda will increase by 24%, relative to the 
previous four-year period, to reach £97 million in 2015  (House of Commons, 2012) 
The analysis of documents of the DFID’s within a context of global discourse of 
development assistance and historical facts can tell us a lot about the UK - Rwanda 
relationship. For instance, why does the DFID, an organisation that puts great 
emphasis on democratic development engage in a close partnership with Rwanda and 
how is it communicated through official documents? Answers to these questions may 
be found in the discourses of the DFID. 
 
Research&Question&
 
In what way do the discourses of DFIDs general policy and the local policy towards 
Rwanda show a consistency or lack thereof between general and country level 
discourses? 
Working Questions !
1. What discourses can be shown in DFID white papers from the period from 
1997 to 2009? 
2. What discourses can be shown in DFIDs policy towards Rwanda in the years 
from1999 to 2004? 
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Methodology 
 
In this section the methodological reflections of this project will be presented. These 
include thoughts on discursive analysis in social science and international 
development studies, the use of critical discourse analysis including its limitations and 
the empirical data with a presentation of the documents and the coding of these. The 
section on critical discourse analysis will present both the method and theory of this 
project. !
Discourse&Analysis&in&Social&science&&
Discourse as both a methodology and theory has a longstanding history within scial 
science. Although the term discourse has been spreading in the vocabulary of social 
scholars over the at last 20 years there is still little consensus on how to define the 
theory or discourse analysis. (Dreyer Hansen, 2007, p. 389) Numerous scholars have 
worked with discourse within social science over the years and have made discourse a 
more widespread phenomenon in the field. Among the most influential can be names, 
Michael Foucault, Norman Fairclough, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. 
There are multiple ways of conducting an analysis on the basis of discourses: 
discourse as a type analysis, a methodology and a theory. They all differ, as each 
scholar represents a variation of discourse. All of the above mentioned scholars have 
inspired the use of discourse as both methodology and theory in other fields closely 
connected with social science. The way in which discourse analysis has developed 
over time within the field of social science has affected other fields; among these are 
International Development Studies (IDS).  (Nedeveen Pieterese, 2011, p. 237)  
(Dreyer Hansen, 2007, pp. 390-391) 
 
Since the 1990s the use of discourse analysis has been increasing within IDS and 
especially within the field of critical IDS. Among the contributor to discourse analysis 
in IDS are Grillo & Stirrats (1997), Apthorpe & Gasper (1996) and Munck & 
O’Hearn (1999).  (Nedeveen Pieterese, 2011, p. 237) 
In 1992 Wolfgang Sachs published his book “Dictionary of Development” where he 
describes development to be “… much more than just a socio-economic endeavour; it 
is a perception which models reality, a myth which comforts societies, and a fantasy 
which unleashes passions’  (Sachs, 1992, p. 1).  
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Taking Sachs’ idea of development as a perception that is created and transmitted 
through language, this becomes a complex discourse that is shaped by those who 
dominate the discipline, namely practitioners, organizations and academics.  
In that way, the resulting documents reflect these actors’ goals, strategies, values and 
beliefs, and they work as a reference for the actions taken in the complex system of 
aid. Consequently they are the product of relationships between donors and receivers 
of assistance, and conversely they work as frame of reference that establishes, shapes 
and affects these relationships. What Sachs calls ‘models’, ‘myths’, and ‘passions’ 
“are sustained by development’s ‘buzzwords” (Cornwall & Eade, 2010). These are 
terms that become a trend, that “get their ‘buzz’ from being in-words, words that 
define what is in vogue”(…) some continuing to ride the wave for decades, others 
appearing briefly only to become submerged for years” and eventually come back 
with the same or different use. (Cornwall & Eade, 2010, p. 3) 
Therefore in order to understand the complex reality of aid and the relationships 
surrounding this issue, it is fundamental to comprehend the words being employed in 
the dominant discourse.  
 
Discourse&analysis&in&International&Development&studies&
Even before the 1990s discourse theory has been used to criticise the research being 
done within the field. In 1978 Edward Said published his book called “Orientalism”. 
Said argued that in imperial times many western scholars have analysed and 
interpreted Asian and Middle Eastern societies through what he calls a lens of 
orientalism. This showed a discourse of societies that were non-western had to be 
exotic. Said further argues that the oriental discourse is not a thing of the past as it 
was still evident in Post-Cold war times.  (Burnell, Randall, & Rakner, 2011, p. 31) 
Other scholars have in later times argued for other discourses being evident in IDS. 
Claude Ake (1996) claims that a discourse of development as ideology exists, and 
finally Arturo Escobar (1995) argues that the underlying discourse of all work in IDS 
is that developing countries have to be made to change. Escobar is perhaps the most 
influential discourse analyst within IDS in newer times, and has sought to apply 
Foucault theory on discourse in his researcher much like Said did earlier.  (Nedeveen 
Pieterese, 2011, pp. 237-238) 
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This project places itself within the field of discourse analysis in International 
development studies describe above, but more narrowly it is placed among other 
scholars that have done discourse analysis of DFID publications. Among these are 
Zoë Marriage (2006) who finds a morality discourse in an examination of DFIDs 
work in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa from 1997 to 2001. Marriage finds 
that a “[closer] investigation reveals that the discourse masks a more fundamental 
reality: DFID defines the morality (and the logistical challenges), and uses the 
positive terminology to credit and legitimise its activity.”.  (Marriage, 2006a, p. 489) 
Leni Wild and Samir Elhawary (2012) argue that a discourse that links development 
and security is evident in the DFIDs White papers starting from 1997 and onwards. 
They argue that the discourse have changed around three key narratives, these are: 
 
“First, that conflict negatively affects development and in turn, promoting 
development can help resolve conflict and build peace. Second, that in an era 
of globalisation and an increasingly interconnected world, conflict cannot be 
ignored as its effects do not respect geographical boundaries and can present 
major risks to UK and international security. And third, that building peace 
and stability requires collaboration across policy spheres, particularly 
development, defence and diplomacy.”  (Wild & Elhawary, 2012, p. 2) 
 
Where as April R. Biccum (2005) finds evidence of a reinvention of colonial 
discourse that entails a focus on ‘poverty’ and DFID being the mechanism for 
replicating liberal democracy through development.  (Biccum, 2005, p. 1018) 
 
It is within this field of both discourse analyses in social science and IDS that this 
project is placed. Specifically it is placed among these discourse analyses previously 
done on DFIDs discourses, and the conclusions of the analysis conducted in this 
project should be seen in this context.  
 
Critical&Discourse&Analysis&
In this project critical discourse analysis will be use as both the methodological and 
theoretical approach. The reason for doing so is grounded in the arguments of 
Norman Fairclough in his book “Discourse and Social Change”. Fairclough argues 
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that the framework for a critical discourse analysis, he has developed, is meant to be a 
method among others for investigating social change.  (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 8-9) 
(Phillips, 2010, p. 285) However it is distinct for putting emphasis on context. 
Fairclough stresses the importance of the context in order to understand the meaning 
of a specific word, sentence or sound. In Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis the 
main context of a word or sentence is the complete text. Additionally, the context in 
which the text exists is relevant; therefore, the source of the text, the local and global 
context should be considered and can bring meaning to the usage of specific words. 
(McMillan, 2005, pp. 3-4) 
Fairclough argues that a three-dimensional conception of discourse is necessary to 
uncover the complete picture from a discourse analysis.  (Fairclough, 1992, p. 72) 
Below the figurative depiction of the three-dimensional conception of discourse is 
shown.  
 
Figure 1: Three-dimensional conception of discourse (Fairclough, 1992, p. 73) 
 
The three-dimensional conception of discourse is based on the basic thought of 
combining three different analytical traditions and thereby uncovering the greater 
context in which discourses are created and effect.  (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 72-73)  
The three dimensions are ‘discourse as text’, ‘discursive practice’ and ‘discourse as 
social practice’; where the first two dimensions are seen as discursive and the latter is 
seen as being non-discursive. Although the three dimensions are presented separately 
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in figure 1 above they are analytically intertwined and in practise it can therefore be 
difficult to talk about one without touching upon the other.  (Fairclough, 1992, p. 73) 
 
Discourse as text  
The inner part of the three-dimensional conception of discourse is ‘text’. By text is 
meant both the spoken and written. (Fairclough, 1992, p. 71) This expands the 
possible focus of a discourse analysis at empirical is not limited to the written 
documents but also speeches and other spoken words that can be transcribed and 
analysed.  When conducting a text analysis as a part of a critical discourse analysis 
Fairclough puts forth four main areas to touch upon.  
 
The first of the four areas are ‘vocabulary’, which in this context suggests dealing 
with words and how some words are articulated over other alternatives ones. The 
analytical focus is on what concepts or actions are used, or that some areas articulated 
more thoroughly than others.  (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 73, 77) 
The second is ‘grammar’ and here the focus on paring of words to form a clause also 
called a simple sentence. Fairclough argues that the way a clause is constructed in a 
text is a product of decisions made by the writer. This would mean to uncover which 
underlying choices were made in regards to the structure and design of a simple 
sentence through an analysis.  (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 75-76) 
Thirdly, ‘cohesion’ is introduced. Here the focus is put on how clauses are combined 
in to form sentences, and further how sentences are linked together and become 
longer pieces of text. Cohesion can be created in several ways, among these the 
repetition of specific word or near synonyms. If cohesion is shown in a text, the 
analysis of it can reveal the rationality behind the arguments that the text creates.  
(Fairclough, 1992, p. 77) 
Lastly the fourth area is ‘text structure’. With this last area the focus becomes wider 
and concerns the architecture of the entire text. Here the broad strokes of a text are 
analysed by looking at how the text is structured, what type of text it is and what 
elements are being connected and utilised to make a specific impression.  (Fairclough, 
1992, pp. 77-78) 
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In this project the four main areas of discourse as text will be utilized in a text 
analysis of each empirical document. Word frequency coding of the documents will 
be used to identify the 20 most used words with connection to development and 
thereby play a role in analysing the vocabulary. Further a textual analysis looking at 
grammar and cohesion in each document will be preformed. Lastly, the text structure 
will be explained through analyzing the type of text the document is, what areas the 
complete document concerns and combine, and what graphical instruments are being 
used to convey the discourse.  
 
Discursive practice 
Discursive practice entails the process of text production, meaning how the text is 
distributed and consumed. These processes may change within different discourses in 
accordance with social factors. When something is either spoken or written, it is an 
expression of discursive practices, i.e. the discursive practices through articulation 
indicate how reality is perceived, interpreted and constructed. Therefore it becomes 
important to uncover the discursive practices within a text as it can give insight in to 
why the text is being articulated in a specific way as oppose to another. Fairclough 
distinguishes between three different areas for analysing discursive practices; these 
are ‘force’, ‘coherence’ and ‘intertextuality’. 
 
‘Force’ is concerned with how the text uses a certain relation to influence the readers 
and make them perform a particular action or have a particular position on a subject. 
It can be a direct use of force, and in this case it will be explicit in the text. Force can 
also be used indirectly to create that desired outcome or reaction, e.g. through 
questions, indirect calls for action, etc. When interpreting the use of force in a text, it 
is important to connect it with the context in which it is being expressed. The effect 
that force has is the creation of different sub-meanings depending on the context. 
(Fairclough, 1992, pp. 82-83) 
 
‘Coherence’ in the analysis of discursive practices is concerned with the interpreter’s 
possibility of constructing a reasonable relationship to the text. This is not a question 
of a classical logic, but rather one of whether the text creates positions and arguments 
that the reader can relate to and thus, become affected. A text will generally be made 
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to give meaning to others within the same discourse, or directly aimed at readers who 
are part of another discourse. This distinction is important to observe as it can change 
the design and argument of a text. (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 83-84) 
 
The last area is ‘intertextuality’, where the focus is on how a text ability to refer 
directly or indirectly to other texts. By referring to other texts the one at hand places 
itself within an existing intertextual chains. For that purpose, Fairclough distinguish 
between ‘manifest intertextuality’ (which happens when a text directly draws on other 
specific texts) and ‘interdiscursivity’ (when the text refers to other discourses). Here it 
is interesting to look at how the texts may transform earlier texts and restructure 
existing discourses, so to generate new ones. (Fairclough, 1992, p. 84) 
 
 In this project it is attempted to uncover the use of all of the three areas of discursive 
practices. Each empirical document will be analysed with focus on whether or not 
force is being utilised in the text to affect the writer in a specific way. Recognising 
‘cohesion’ is necessary to determine the discourses present in the texts, and 
‘intertextuality’ is used either to place the text within a scope of other texts or 
restructure existing discourses.  
Discourse as social practice 
The third dimension in the three- dimensional conception of discourse is ‘social 
practice’. This dimension is the only one in figure 1 that Fairclough describes as ‘non-
discursive’. He does not believe that this level can be grasped with discourse analysis, 
and therefore it is necessary to include the relevant theory. He believes, however, that 
the discursive practices are embedded in the social structure and practice. The social 
practice has an impact on how reality is perceived, described and articulated in the 
discursive practice. Social Practice has several orientations and discourses, and can be 
implicated in economic, political, cultural, ideological orientations without any of 
them being reducible to discourse. This means that within a specific orientation 
discourses can be components that coexist with the non-discursive social practices. 
This again underlines the interdependence between the three dimensions in figure 1.   
To analyse the social practice Fairclough draws on the Marxist tradition and 
highlights the concepts of ideology and hegemony. (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 63-66, 71) 
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‘Ideology’ is seen as a construction of reality. The structures are built into the various 
dimensions of discursive practices, and contribute to the production, reproduction and 
transformation of dominant relations. Ideology is most effectively embedded in a 
discursive practice, when it is seems naturally and has the status of being common 
sense. Ideologies are created in society on the basis of dominant power relations and 
ideological discourses are those that help to maintain or transform power relations.  
(Fairclough, 1992, pp. 86-87) 
 
‘Hegemony’ refers to the struggles around the unstable relationship between classes 
and groups. The means of establishing hegemony is creating alliances and 
establishing one's ideology rather than others. This means that the practitioner of a 
discourse is part of a struggle to get the most impact on the prevailing discourse in 
society. This process of dominating the discourse in society is constant, and therefore 
a dynamic process in which the outcome will always be temporary and open to 
change, struggle for social practice.  (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 91-92) 
 
In the analysis of this project the discourse as social practice will be used to uncover 
how and if ideology and hegemony is used to transform or maintain discourses. This 
will be done by determining in what way ideology is embedded in discursive 
practices, and in what way it aims to affect power relations. Further, we will focus on 
how the struggle for impact on the prevailing discourses stands out in the documents. 
Overall this will be done by including facts, discourses and practices about the 
international context and the local British and Rwandan context. 
 
Limitations of the Critical Discourse Analysis 
When using Fairclough as the theoretical outset of this project, his ideas have 
inevitably had an impact on our findings. In that regard we believe that it is inevitable 
that our research becomes influenced by the theoretical frame in which the analysis 
has been developed. This does not make our findings less valid, but we are aware that 
the conclusions of this project should always be seen as a product of the critical 
discourse analysis and the context in which is exists. 
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The Use of Quantitative Data Software Programme 
In this project we have processed the empirical document in a way that reflects both 
qualitative and quantitative research methods. In general the field of critical discourse 
analysis mainly makes use of qualitative methodology. Therefore, it is worth it to 
explain further on the reasons why, and how, we make use of both quantitative and 
qualitative methods.  (Hardt-Mautner, 1995, p. 1) When looking at Faircloughs 
works, he himself uses the method of identifying keywords through the frequency 
with which specific words are being used.  (Fairclough, 2000, pp. 16-17) With 
inspiration on Fairclough’s own use of word frequency data, we expand here on our 
explanation on how quantitative data produced by utilising a software programme fits 
with the theory and methodology of critical discourse analysis.  
Gerlinde Hardt-Mautners technical paper from 1995 inspired to use a method that 
combines the use of qualitative method from critical discourse analysis and qualitative 
method from corpus linguistics. The argument for combining these two 
methodologies is based on the idea that, when working with larger amount of 
empirical documents these techniques can compliment rather than replace each other.  
(Hardt-Mautner, 1995, pp. 1-2) Although we introduce the element of quantitative 
methodology as used in corpus linguistics, the methodology of this project continues 
to be critical discourse analysis as outlined above. The way in which the corpus 
linguistics qualitative method is used is through utilising a software program that 
counts the frequency of each word in a specific document.1 Within the field of critical 
discourse analysis there is a general dissatisfaction with the use of methods and tools 
that create distance between the discourses itself and its context. This leads back to 
the fundamental view of critical discourse analysis, where the context is always 
important and must be considered together with the discourse to get the full picture. 
Hardt-Mautner agrees that as a general rule this idea that the use of software 
programmes creates distance between discourse and context is applicable to the 
indiscriminate use of software alone. But a combination of methods can useful and 
complementary of each other.  (Hardt-Mautner, 1995, p. 3) 
In our project the quantitative element is the tables that presents the frequency in 
which the words are being used in the individual documents. The data presented in the 
tables was produced by using a software programme that has calculated the word !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 A detailed description of the coding process will follow below under the headline ‘The Coding 
Process’.!
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frequency. The quantitative data is in itself not the foundation of the analysis but is 
used to open up the research question and get an instant look at the empirical 
documents at hand. Throughout this project the qualitative data is used in a way that 
does not discard the findings of the textual critical discourse analysis, instead we use 
it to supplement, extent and complement findings. Furthermore we stay true to the 
fundamental view of the critical discourse analysis and put findings in to the global 
context of the international community, and the local context of both the United 
Kingdom and Rwanda.  
 
The&Empirical&Data&
The empirical data of this project consists of official documents from the UK’s DFID 
and data provided by the coding of the documents. The documents analysed are of 
various types; these are White Papers, country specific policy papers and speeches by 
the Secretary of State for International Development. Although they differ in form, 
the common feature is that they are all representative of the DFIDs point of view. 
With a focus on the changes in how development is being articulated by the DFID, it 
is important that the documents collectively cover a period large enough for the 
analysis to be able to show changes in wording and discourse over time. That is why 
our selected documents are spread over a period from 1997 to 2009. 
 
The choice of working with documents in the first place stems from the research 
question. We wish to uncover how and why changes in the discourses used by DFID 
to articulate development in Rwanda have happened in this specific period of time. 
We are interested in discourse, and we look into words connected to development in 
some form. By looking at both the contents of the document and thereby the context 
in which the words are being used, and the data provided by coding, we believe, is the 
necessary empirical data to support the discursive analysis. 
 
With our research question in mind, the documents have therefore been chosen from 
the pool of documents that the DFID produce every year. Through the process of 
choosing the empirical data, extensive amounts of documents have been looked 
through. Seven primary documents came out of this process and these will be used in 
the analysis. In the discussion we will elaborate on the results from the analysis by 
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using various new documents, among them academic articles. 
 
To get a better grip on the documents we have chosen to code all 7 documents that 
reflect the UK’s discourse and created data tables that reveal the 20 most used words 
in each document. The chosen documents holds information relevant for this specific 
project, but also contain information that is not as relevant. Coding therefore is a tool 
that helps to lay focus within the extensive documents, and equally important, makes 
it possible to expose the connection between them. Since our documents are of 
different types and also set differently in time, coding creates a collected body of 
empirical data. From the initial readings of potential empirical data, and with footing 
in the discursive method, we have chosen to focus on words with a connection to 
development in the coding process.  
Below the 7 documents will be put in to categories and elaborated on. Further the 
coding process will be described thoroughly. 
 
The Documents 
The documents we have chosen to use, as our empirical foundation is official 
documents from the UK’s DFID. Collectively, they cover the years from 1997 to 
2009. There are 7 main documents that will be the basis of the discursive analysis 
conducted in this project. The 7 documents have been divided into two groups; DFIDs 
general policy and DFIDs policy towards Rwanda. There are four documents in each 
of the two groups. The documents showing DFIDs general policy will be used in the 
first part of the analysis, and the documents on DFIDs policy towards Rwanda will be 
used in the second part. 
All 7 of the documents have been coded and the data it produced will be used in the 
analysis alongside the documents itself. 
Below the documents will be shown in the two groups and all 7 documents will be 
elaborated on. 
 
 
DFIDs%general%policy%
Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century (1997): White paper on 
international development presented to the parliament by the United Kingdom’s 
Secretary of State for International Development on November 1997. The White 
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paper is the first one published after the DFID was made a separate department from 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.  
 
Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor (2000): White 
paper published in 2000 by the British government. This White paper follows up on 
the previous from 1997 and presents new goals.  
 
Eliminating World Poverty: Making Governance Work for he Poor (2006): White 
paper presented in 2006 by Hillary Benn. In 2002 Benn replaced Clare Short as the 
Secretary of State for International Development. 
 
Eliminating World Poverty: Building or Common Future (2009): White paper from 
July 2009 presented by Douglas Alexander. He took over at Secretary of State for 
International Development in 2007 from Hillary Benn. 
 
DFIDs%policy%towards%Rwanda%
Rwanda: Country Strategy Paper 1999 (1999): This paper is from 1999 and presents 
DFIDs Rwanda strategy for the next 3 years. Country Strategy Papers are made for all 
countries that DFID provide with development assistance programmes.  
 
Speech by Clare Short at the Labour Party Conference 2000 (2000): The Speech was 
presented by Clare Short at the Labour Party Conference on 26th of September 2000. 
At this point in time Clare Short is the Secretary of State for International 
Development. 
 
Rwanda Country Assistance Plan 2003-2006 (2004): The Country Assistance Plan is 
presented by DFID in 2004. The Country Assistance Plans are set out DFIDS aim to 
assist Rwanda in achieving its own Poverty Reduction Strategy and the Millennium 
Development Goals. 
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The Coding Process 
The aim of the coding was to provide data for the analysis that would make it possible 
to answer the posed research question. The aim was to find the frequency of words in 
the 7 documents, and then identify the 20 most used words connected to development 
in each document. 
The coding of the empirical documents has been done in two levels. The first level of 
coding was done with a software program that calculates the frequency with which 
each word is used in a specific document. The software produces a complete list over 
every word in the document, even if the frequency is only one. Similarly the software 
produces a large amount of other information, most of it not useful for this project. In 
this project we make use of the frequency count and the total amount of words in each 
document. The software is very helpful in the coding process, but it makes 
distinctions that makes a second level of coding necessary. The software distinguishes 
between capital letters and non-capital letters i.e. we get a frequency for both 
Development and development. To get the accurate frequency of each word a second 
level of coding was done by utilising the build in finder function in Adobe Reader. 
Before applying the second level of coding we identified the words that in some way 
could be connected to development. When these words were identified the second 
level of coding was done. As mentioned above the individual words were calculated 
again by using the finder function in Adobe Reader. This made it possible to count 
words and include the inflections of the same word, e.g. commit, committed and 
committing would be counted as the same word. 
The coding resulted in 7 tables, one for each document, presenting the 20 most used 
words connected to development for the individual document. The tables show the 
words rank, frequency and percentage of all words in the document. All 7 tables are 
placed in the annex of this project. !!
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Background&
This chapter presents information that, in addition to the analysis of the official 
documents and discourses of the UK government, can contribute to the understanding 
of the UK’s discourse regarding Rwanda. It provides first an overview of ideas about 
the current global aid regime wherein donor and receiver countries act.  
Furthermore, it presents the role of the UK as a donor before the genocide in Rwanda, 
and prior to that event, as an influential actor in the international community. 
Also, the two more commonly accepted views on the origin of the genocide are 
introduced, as they work as a basis for Kagame’s policies regarding freedom of 
speech and the limitations of the democratic space, which are ultimately being 
supported by the DFID. In addition, empirical data about the leadership of Paul 
Kagame can be found here, mostly from the media and journalistic sources. And 
equally important, the allegations of Human Rights violations in Rwanda are also 
presented in this section. 
 
The&current&trends&within&the&global&aid&regime&
The international aid system has seen in 2005 the birth of the ‘Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness’, in an attempt to reunite the efforts of over a hundred donors and 
recipients and to provide a new frame for the development practices. It “encourages 
donors to align their efforts to recipient governments’ own development strategies 
and administrative systems” (Whitfield & Fraser, 2009, p. 3). This initiative, intended 
to bring real change to the results of the implementation of aid, reflects for its 
signatories the principles that “will increase the impact aid has in reducing poverty 
and inequality, increasing growth, building capacity and accelerating achievement of 
the MDGs” (OECD, 2005/2008). 
One of the main pillars of the ‘Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness’ and the ‘Accra 
Agenda for Action’ of September 2008, is the character of ‘ownership’2 given to the 
recipient countries in order to allow them to manage their own strategies, systems of 
governance and policies: 
 
“Developing countries determine and implement their development !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Whitfield and Fraser define ’ownership’ as ”the degree of control recipient governments are able to 
secure over implemented policy outcomes” (Whitfield & Fraser, 2009, p. 4)  
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policies to achieve their own economic, social and environmental goals. 
We agreed in the Paris Declaration that this would be our first 
priority…” (OECD, 2005/2008, p. 16) 
 
Accordingly,  (Whitfield & Fraser, 2009) suggest that the potential of change does not 
lay in traditional donors but rather in the strategy of the African countries -who, 
moreover, ‘should have’ control over policies.  
 
However, this new approach to aid has been received in different ways. The current 
situation of the global aid system produces scepticism surrounding the rhetoric of the 
Declaration and its potential to improve results. Questions are raised about the 
equality of the commitment of the donors to the Paris Declaration, and the lack of real 
change in the behaviour of most of these donors. (Whitfield & Fraser, 2009)  
Furthermore, in views of the new stance taken by donors in the last declaration, some 
perceive a shift in global development rather than a change of strategy, and this is a 
product of the crisis in which the aid regime is immersed. McEwan and Mawdsley 
(2012) e.g. talk of a “growing legitimacy crisis of the global development governance 
regime” (McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012). Chin & Quadir (2012) speak of “a 
breakdown” in the global aid regime that had evidenced signs of deterioration since 
the early 2000s (Chin & Quadir, 2012, p. 498). 
 
Perhaps it is the discontent with the system of assistance led by the traditional OECD 
DAC donors and the UN that a new discourse emerged, being brought up by the Paris 
Declaration. It provides, as mentioned before, a bigger role to the recipient countries 
in the management of the project. However, it is still given within the frame of the 
discourse of the traditional donors and the OECD-DAC3 approach, which focuses 
since the early 1990’s on the promotion of ‘civil society’, ‘democracy’, ‘human 
rights’ and the ‘rule of law’ (Carothers and Ottaway, 2000 and Sardamov, 2005 as 
cited in Chin & Quadir, 2012, p. 499) and last but not least, poverty alleviation. 
However, some claim that “The idea that aid need not be coercive or paternalistic, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD-DAC). The members of the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) are 29: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, European 
Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, The 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland United Kingdom and United States. 
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but can instead reflect a partnership of equals between donor and recipient 
government is not new, neither is scepticism towards it”  (Whitfield & Fraser, 2009, 
p. 76)  
 
The use of a discourse of partnership is rooted in the efforts of the DAC Committee 
made around 1996 to reverse the decline of flows, caused by the lack of needed 
strategic presence in certain countries after the end of the Cold War and the failure of 
the IMF-World Bank economic programmes. The Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action states “We agreed to develop a 
genuine partnership, with developing countries clearly in charge of their own 
development processes.”  (OECD, 2005/2008, p. 15). Accordingly, Whitfield and 
Fraser call the period from 2000 the “The Partnership Era” (Whitfield & Fraser, 
2009, p. 76).  
 
The international system of aid, led by the OECD countries is to a large extent guided 
by the principles of the UN’s MDGs, which are considered as “the most broadly 
supported, comprehensive, and specific poverty reduction targets the world has ever 
established” and “too important to fail”. For the international political system, they 
are the fulcrum on which development policy is based”. (UN Millenium Project, p. 2) 
Falling short in solving the problem of poverty in the world is the biggest obstacle to 
accomplish the MDGs, and the credibility of the current paradigm of aid effectiveness 
is “under intense pressure” because of this failure (McEwan & Mawdsley, 2012).  
The donors believe that the strategies and principles that are born in various summits 
and reflected in these documents “will increase the impact aid has in reducing 
poverty and inequality, increasing growth, building capacity and accelerating 
achievement of the MDGs”. (OECD, 2005/2008, p. 1; OECD, 2005/2008) 
Furthermore, they express their desire for a world free of the problem of extreme 
poverty and the existence of countries that are no longer dependent on aid  (OECD, 
2005/2008, p. 21). And it is in the direction of poverty reduction and economic 
development that they drive their strategies and actions, supporting “partner 
countries’ national development strategies, institutions and procedures”  (OECD, 
2005/2008, p. 3) 
 
Subscribers to the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness 2005 and the Accra Agenda 
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for Action of 2008 acknowledge the importance of the problem of extreme poverty in 
the world and the need of successful actions to solve this issue. Poverty reduction is 
considered an “overarching strategy” (OECD, 2005/2008, p. 3) and it becomes to a 
great extent a parameter to measure the success and effectiveness of aid.  
In this arrangement developing countries must comply with “international 
commitments on gender equality, human rights, disability and environmental 
sustainability”  (OECD, 2005/2008, p. 15) while on the other side, donors are 
committed to be active in the process implementation of policies in this direction, and 
make sure that these aspects, which are part of the western values and traditions, are 
secured as well4  
 
UK’s&role&in&preGgenocide&Rwanda&
The UK as one of the leaders of the international community, major donor, highly 
influential in the UN, and with right to veto in the UNSC is examined in its 
performance regarding the conflict in Rwanda. Many of the decisions regarding aid 
policy towards Rwanda can also be based on the actions that the UK took in the past. 
 
“If we know and we fail to act, we are responsible. Rwanda erupted in 
genocide. We knew. We failed to act. We were responsible”  (Blair, 2010, p. 
61). (…) “Now it’s true you have to reflect on those who would have died if 
you had refused to act. If we had acted as we should have in (…) Rwanda, 
many lives would have been saved”. (Blair, 2010, p. 573). 
 
In this way, Tony Blair reflects in his book about the lack of intervention in Rwanda 
in views of the genocide. He states that the British knew about it in advance, and 
acknowledges their share of the guilt, but he also states that it is doubtful that the 
international community would have done something in regards. So in that matter he 
blames the dynamics of politics at international level as he claims that the UNSC 
would not have reached an agreement to act in Rwanda  (Blair, 2010, p. 397).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Kragelund (2008) believes that “membership of OECD affects central themes in development such as 
democracy and the market economy, as OECD is not only the club of the rich countries, but also a 
community of shared values” (Kragelund, 2008, p. 556).  
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There is not much literature about UK’s role as a donor in Rwanda before the 
genocide, as their presence was not particularly relevant at that point. Though there 
are interesting productions about the role of the international community in the 
intervention, peacekeeping mission and aftermath of the genocide. 
 
Before the genocide, Rwanda was already one of the most aided countries in the 
world. According to the OECD, ODA accounted for 11.4 per cent if its GNP in 1989-
90; higher than the average for Africa and the least developed countries. Numbers by 
the World Bank tell that foreign assistance financed over 70 per cent of public 
investment in the period 1982-1987. By the 1990s, there were approximately 300 
donors in the country: around 20 bilateral, 30 multilateral and estimated 250 foreign 
and local NGOs (Uvin, 1999, p. 15). At the time the genocide took place in the 
country, there was plenty of foreign presence (being the UK among them) though 
they were neither a major donor nor holders of a strong relationship with the 
government as, for example, Belgium had. The UK had no history as a donor in 
Rwanda prior to 1994, and it was in 1995 that the British Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO) established a small embassy in Kigali, and 1997 that the DFID began 
the partnership with the Rwandan government  (Marriage, 2006b, p. 28). “Although 
strongly present in Uganda and Tanzania, with diplomatic representation in Zaire, 
the UK’s bilateral relations with Rwanda (...) were extremely limited  (Hayman, 2010, 
p. 9).  
British official discourse talks about the lack of a relationship with Rwanda, e.g. the 
DFID Country Strategy Paper of 1999 states: “There is a continental European 
tradition in Rwanda’s administrative structures, systems and bureaucracy with which 
we are unfamiliar” (DFID, 1999, p. 5). Such as statement can indicate that since the 
UK was not highly involved in Rwanda, it was less capable to act in order to prevent 
the atrocities of 1994. In addition, Hayman argues that according to Lynda Chalker 
(former UK Minister for Development Cooperation) “the engagement in Rwanda 
since 1994 has therefore been premised upon the UK’s ‘clean slate’, untainted by 
association with the former regime” (Hayman, 2010, p. 9). This is also made clear in 
the DFID document of 1999, “We do not have an historical legacy in Rwanda; we 
are trusted and regarded as even-handed.”  (DFID, 1999, p. 5) So the lack of a 
historical legacy is portrayed by the UK official discourse as an advantage for the 
further engagement with Rwanda, but also as a justification to their ‘innocence’ for 
! 25!
their lack of action in Rwanda in 1994. This innocence is according to following 
authors cited in Hayman (2010) questionable. The UK is rather reflecting an attitude 
of “total indifference”, given that Rwanda laid beyond Britain’s sphere of influence or 
interest at that time. Accordingly, Porteous (2005) argues that and Britain’s lack of 
vision vis-à-vis Africa was actually because of the focus that at that time, the 
government was laying on Central and Eastern Europe and strategic middle income 
countries (Healey, 1997; Williams, 2004; Porteous, 2005 as cited in Hayman, 2010, p. 
9). It is widely known that the British government together with the US obstructed the 
UNSC intervention in Rwanda. Although Tony Blair says that “It would have been 
highly doubtful if we could ever have got UNSC agreement” in Rwanda (Blair, 2010, 
p. 397) some suggest that there was in fact an agreement, but this was about not to 
intervene. 
  
In early 1994, the Rwandan government asked (not for the first time) the UN to 
dismantle armed groups, but the peacekeepers were too weak, tells Kuperman (2000). 
Belgium pleaded for reinforcements as the mission in Rwanda, UNAMIR was not 
able maintain the order in that country. “But the United States and Britain blocked 
this initiative before it could even reach a vote, citing the costs of more troops and the 
danger that expanding the mission could endanger peacekeepers”  (Kuperman, 2000) 
Alison Des Forges in her report for Human Rights Watch shares this view and adds 
that the “UK government supposedly wanted to limit UN involvement to diplomacy, 
apparently fearing that the organisation might collapse under the strain of trying 
anything more ambitious” (Des Forges, 1999, p. 967). 
 
Moreover, Dallaire5 et al. take a more critical stance saying that the UK “played the 
matter down” (Dallaire, Manocha, & Degnarain, 2005, p. 873) and avoided the use 
the word ‘genocide’ as it implies a responsibility for the UNSC to act, and “allowed 
weapons to be supplied to the genocidal Rwandan government both before and during 
the 1994 genocide” (Dallaire, Manocha, & Degnarain, 2005, p. 874).  
They further state that: 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Romeo Dallaire apart from being a Fellow at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the 
Kennedy School of Government of Harvard University was the Force Commander of the United 
Nations Assistance Missions for Rwanda (UNAMIR). (Dallaire, Manocha, & N, 2005) 
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“Faced with incontrovertible evidence of the most clear-cut case of genocide 
possible, the international community failed to denounce the evil and to take 
action to stop the killings taking place in Rwanda in 1994. Under the influence 
of three major powers - France, the United States and the United Kingdom - 
the United Nations was disabled from taking the necessary action because the 
mass slaughter of the Tutsi people did not impinge on these powers’ narrowly 
defined national interests”  (Dallaire, Manocha, & Degnarain, 2005, p. 861). 
 
However, the UK had changed position during the process of the genocide, which 
indicates the slow beginning of its now strong relationship with Rwanda.  
Dallaire recognizes in this matter that the “British government was rather 
forthcoming with its response to the refugee crisis that followed the genocide” 
(Dallaire, Manocha, & Degnarain, 2005, p. 875). 
It started with a contribution of a very small budget for direct action provided through 
the UN and NGOs from 1994 to 1996. Hayman in her research has interviewed 
Rwandan officials in Kigali, and she perceives that these people felt that the UK 
contribution “had made a considerable difference because the UK was willing to 
engage positively with the government, not to be judgemental or expect rapid change, 
and to be flexible in its approach” (Hayman, 2010, p. 9). 
The Rwandan Patriotic Front has from the outset in 1994 meant that the UK is a 
‘good friend’, with Rwandan politicians and officials describing the UK as “very 
supportive”, “genuinely trying to help”, having a real “will to cooperate”  (Hayman, 
2010, pp. 9-10).  
It is not clear what led the UK to prevent the international community from acting in 
Rwanda’s genocide, if this was the case. One can certainly question whether the 
actions that the UK took after the genocide are a way to compensate for not 
preventing the slaughter of almost one million people. 
 
The&Rwandan&Genocide&of&1994&
The mentioned genocide broke out in Rwanda after decades of tension between the 
two major groups in the country: Hutus and Tutsis. The prevention of conflict 
between these two ethnicities is the basis for the arguments for keeping a reduced 
space of freedom of speech in Rwanda. So although it happened in 1994 it is 
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necessary to bring in the topic, as it has implications for the politics of today’s 
Rwanda. 
 
From the 6th of April to 8 July 1994 an estimated number of 800.000 people were 
slaughtered. Most of the victims were Tutsis, but moderate Hutus were also murdered. 
There is no agreement on the exact number of deaths but a widely accepted number is 
around 800.000. The Hutus, who made up the ethnic majority in the country (about 
82% of the total population), incited by propaganda against the Tutsis (17% of the 
total population), performed this horrific act. A third group is the Twa (under 1% of 
the total population) but they are considerably less in number. According to Allison 
Des Forges’ extensive report for Human Rights Watch, the reasons for the genocide 
were not based on tribal hatred or as a result of poverty. The genocide resulted from 
“the deliberate choice of a modern elite”  (Des Forges, 1999, p. 1) to use the existent 
ethnic division to promote hatred and remain in power. By setting the majority 
(Hutus) against the minority (Tutsis) this group expected to eliminate the growing 
political opposition within Rwanda.  (Des Forges, 1999, pp. 1-2). 
 
There has always been a historical division between these two groups: As the Hutus 
were oppressed and excluded, while the Tutsis were the ruling minority, economically 
more privileged and owning most of the land. A short chronology of important events  
(BBC, 2014) shows that those differences have also been present in the politics of this 
unstable country. Furthermore, colonial rule, authoritarian leaders, violent events and 
confrontations, displacement of people to the neighbouring countries etc., took place 
in a society where vast majority of the population living in extreme poverty and 
deprivation. Those conditions created the instability and dissatisfaction that led to the 
outbreak of a mass murder that would eliminate almost one million Rwandans. 
Accordingly Peter Uvin (2001) mentions two different discourses that have been 
widely spread in regards to the causes of the genocide.  On one side there is “what 
could be called the official Hutu discourse”  (Uvin, 2001, p. 76), the one used in the 
genocide and which remains accepted by Hutu radicals. It is basically the essentialist 
approach to ethnicity; the Hutu and the Tutsi are essentially different, with different 
origins, different histories and culture, “and -this is where prejudice comes in- 
different moral and ethical features”. On the other side, the official discourse of the 
post-genocide government is that the division is a social construction, with roots in 
! 28!
the colonial period that has opened divisions between these two groups by the 
practices and politics of that moment.  (Uvin, 2001, p. 76) While the dominant view 
on the Rwandan ethnicity during the colonial rule was the essentialism, nowadays the 
dominant approach taken by researchers and journalists is the constructivist. It is also 
the approach on ethnicity chosen and permitted by the Rwandan Government.  (Uvin, 
2001, p. 77) The dominant discourse of the government in Rwanda, that prohibits the 
mention of ethnic differences to avoid conflict, is the rationality behind the actions 
that have placed the Kagame administration under criticism for limitations to the 
freedom of speech, lack of diversity of political views and consequently a weak 
democracy. 
 
President&Kagame’s&controversial&image&!
"How do you take a country that's been through hell and bring it to security 
and prosperity? This is about healing, and this is about hope. We think it can 
be done" Éliane Ubalijoro, adviser to President Kagame, said to a researcher at 
Montreal's McGill.  (Chu, 2009). 
 
Kagame is undoubtedly a president that managed to build out of the ashes a country 
that does not have many resources to base growth on. Landlocked, with an eighth of 
its population killed in the genocide, where the vast majority of the people depend on 
farming for subsistence. Kagame has been widely credited for the accomplishments 
that are mostly due to capacity of governance in Rwanda, and his ability to create 
networks abroad.  
 
Kagame is often seen in public while taking trips to western countries such as the US 
and the UK. Among his friends are businessmen such as the James Sinegal (co-
founder of Costco) and Howard Schultz (CEO of Starbucks) who now buy their 
coffee from Rwanda after having personal meetings with the president. Furthermore, 
they have co-hosted a dinner for Kagame with executives from companies including 
Microsoft  (Chu, 2009). Major philanthropists such as Bill Gates (Gates Foundation 
cites Kagame as a model)  (Zakaria, 2009), politicians such as Tony Blair and other 
important businessmen (for example from Google) have also shown support publicly 
(Office of Tony Blair, 2013). 
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“He recruits more friends. And it's beginning to look as if his personal 
strategy -- selling people on Rwanda's story and its promise, telling them that 
this is a place where they can make a difference as well as profits -- just might 
work”  (Chu, 2009). 
 
His plan is depicted as “crazily audacious”, “impossible”, “the African Gorilla in the 
21st Century”  (Chu, 2009). CNN’s analysts states that Rwanda is “the biggest success 
story out of the African continent” “a poster child for success”, his government is 
described as “one of the more efficient and honest ones in Africa”. Fortune magazine 
published an article titled "Why CEOs Love Rwanda.", where it is made clear that 
“much of it has to do with its president. President Kagame was the leader of the 
forces that came in and ended the genocide. He has led the country since then”.  
(Zakaria, 2009) 
 
This undoubted image of Kagame’s as a model prevailed for years. But, recently, says 
The Guardian, there's been a very public shift after the possible presence of Rwanda 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo: the “Once-unquestioning support from 
Washington, where Bill Clinton called Kagame "one of the greatest leaders of our 
time", has given way to cuts in military aid and warnings from the US war crimes 
chief that Rwanda's leadership could find itself under investigation from the 
international criminal court over its backing for rebels in eastern Congo”  (McGreal, 
2013) 
 
Human&Rights&and&Democracy&in&Rwanda&
Rwanda, a country that used to be known for the massive atrocities that took place 
only twenty years ago, now is being praised for its recovery. “Most people assumed 
that Rwanda was broken and, like Somalia, another country wracked by violence, 
would become a poster child for Africa's failed states. It's now a poster child for 
success” (Zakaria, 2009).  
As previously seen, the recovery of Rwanda and the success in key matters of 
governance are highly credited to president Kagame. His strong leadership and his 
capacity for establishing personal relationships with rich and powerful states and 
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individuals has allowed him to receive the vast amount of official development 
assistance and private investment that have driven Rwanda’s process of recovery and 
improvement. Accordingly, Friedman states that “undoubtedly, is the ability of 
Kagame to invoke the guilt that riddled the international community for its inaction 
during the genocide”  (Friedman, 2012, p. 266). Furthermore, applying a top-down 
coordination and control of the economy, together with an aggressive anti-corruption 
effort that has seen a large amount of success  (Friedman, 2012, p. 256).  
Although it is not questionable that the rule of Kagame has brought benefits to 
Rwanda, Friedman (who analyses the Vision 2020 6  through the lens of 
democratisation) tells that this model, although economically successful, can probably 
be unsustainable in time, as it is highly dependent on his persona and a small group 
that surrounds him: “it created the groundwork for an authoritarian state in which 
both the public and private sectors are controlled almost exclusively by President 
Kagame and other former members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front. Growth and 
stability is in the hands of that group”  (Friedman, 2012, p. 267) 
Moreover, this strategy can be socially and politically damaging: “It is possible that 
such control is damaging to freedoms and liberties and thus would be incompatible 
with emerging democracies” (Friedman, 2012, p. 267). In addition, the control of the 
economy in the hands of a small group, can give them power that is strong enough to 
destroy the democratic policy space: “The government-directed economic 
development scheme creates a singular source of power that transcends sectors and 
creates a vacuum in civil society that stumps the democratic process” (Friedman, 
2012, p. 267) 
 
In the end, the economic recovery has also a high cost that is not always being 
acknowledged by Kagame’s local and foreign supporters. Altogether, Rwanda 
continues to be a site for violations of human rights, and its president is being 
criticized for his policies towards democracy and freedom of speech. Friedman states 
that: “While the Rwandan economy has blossomed, individual freedoms have not”  
(Friedman, 2012, p. 256).  
 
Human Rights Watch has repeatedly accused the Kagame’s government for problems !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 This is the strategy for develop made by the Rwandan government 
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of human rights. For instance the use of solitary confinement in life imprisonment 
sentences, has been illegal in Rwanda since 2008 but the use continues despite of its 
illegality  (Human Rights Watch, 2009). Another example is the disappearance of 
people that was detained under the suspicion of different types of crime “running 
from the deaths workmen, to commercial rivalries, to coup plotting”  (Human Rights 
Watch, 2007); the increase of crimes among the police, such as murder in police 
custody, where officers of the National Police have killed at least 20 detainees since 
November 2006 to July 2007  (Human Rights Watch, 2007). 
 
Regarding the political situation, the international human rights organization, 
Freedom House, in its annual “Freedom in the World” (as cited in Friedman) gives 
Rwanda the status “Not Free” and declining due to “a severe crackdown on 
opposition”  (Friedman, 2012, p. 256). Moreover, both Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International have expressed their concerns.  
The first one, for example, makes an account of journalists and politicians that were 
found guilty on charges related with freedom of speech and ethnic division, where 
“divisionism” is often argument for prison, but also defamation, minimizing the 
genocide, endangering national security, among others. The lack of official 
investigation of the murder of a leader of the opposition party, the Democratic Green 
Party, in 2010 is also a concern. They believe that in Rwanda “the government should 
allow journalists and political parties to carry out their legitimate activities without 
fear for their safety”  (Human Rights Watch, 2011) 
In the same way, the report by Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: Safer to stay silent: 
The chilling effect of Rwanda's laws on 'genocide ideology' and 'sectarianism'’, states 
that the impact of the laws that criminalize ‘genocide ideology’ and ‘insulting the 
President’ are being used to limit criticism and dissent, intimidating political 
opposition and harassing political groups. For example, some were prevented from 
registering in the run-up to the 2010 presidential elections, in the 2003 presidential 
elections and the 2008 legislative elections. A media law placed restrictions on press 
freedom, as journalists critical of the government are not allowed in official press 
conferences and the Rwandan High Media Council shuts down newspapers. Amnesty 
International believes that all these laws have a cumulative effect in silencing dissent 
in Rwandan society  (Amnesty International, 2010, p. 12). 
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Kagame’s response to accusations of this type is that “They are hypocrites, blind to 
their own histories, says Rwanda's president." Who are these gods who police others 
for their rights?" he says in an interview with the newspaper, Observer, at the 
presidential office in Kigali. "One of the things I live for is to challenge that. I grew 
up in a refugee camp. Thirty years. This so-called human-rights world didn't ask me 
what was happening for me to be there 30 years."  (McGreal, 2013) 
 !
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Analysis&&
This chapter will present our critical discourse analysis of the 7 empirical documents 
presented in methodology. The analysis that follows below will be divided in to two 
sections; Discourses in DFIDs general policy and Discourses in DFIDs policy 
towards Rwanda. The first part will focus on how the discourse has changed overtime 
in the general development policy of the United Kingdom. This will be done through 
presenting and analysing four white papers from the DFID covering the period from 
1997 until 2009. The second part of the analysis will focus on what discourses show 
in UKs policy towards Rwanda. This will be done through presenting and analysing 
three documents from the DFID covering the period from 1999 until 2004. 
Both parts of the analysis will be structured in the same fashion. Each part will start 
with presenting the findings of the analysis to come. The findings will be followed by 
the critical discourse analysis where the vocabulary will be analysed first followed by 
a textual analysis of each individual document. The empirical data will be analysed 
with our theoretical framework in mind. We are aware that the prevalent discourses 
found in other academic works of the DFID in the same period, and will keep that in 
mind when doing the analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ! !
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Discourses&in&DFIDs&general&policy&
 
In this section the first working question ‘What discourses can be shown in DFID 
white papers from the period from 1997 to 2009?’ will be answered. 
A critical discourse analysis will be done on the four white papers presented in the 
methodology. The white papers are: Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 
21st Century (1997), Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the 
Poor (2000), Eliminating World Poverty: Making Governance Work for he Poor 
(2006) and Eliminating World Poverty: Building or Common Future (2009). First the 
vocabulary of all the documents will collectively be analysed through the produced 
word-frequency data. Second, each white paper will analysed individually so to 
uncover discourses.  
 
In this section of the critical discourse analysis we have found that a morality 
discourse is evident in 1997 and gets further established in the 2006 White Paper. 
Further, in 2009 the morality discourse seems to be put in the background, as other 
discourses are more relevant. The discourses that overpower the morality discourse 
are a value for money and security as a mean to development. The discourse of value 
for money is being established in 2009 and doesn’t appear in the other White Papers, 
but the development as security discourse is also seen in 2006. In the White Paper 
from 2000 a discourse of the UK as a leading nation in development assistance 
becomes evident, and it continues to be present in both 2006 and 2009. Lastly a 
colonial discourse of spreading democracy is very pronounced in 2006, and only 
seems to be present in after in 2009 and not before in 1997 and 2000. 
 
Vocabulary of all four White Papers 
The use of vocabulary in the White Papers is similar but the frequency of the key 
individual words in each White Paper varies. The frequency is reflected in the rank 
that a word has within the top twenty most used words in connection with 
development. This part of the analysis is based on the data from tables 1 through 4 
that are placed in the annex. 
In 1997 the word ‘UK’ ranks eighteen in the top twenty words connected to 
development. The rank of the ‘UK’ changes to seventh in 2000, fourth in 2006 and 
third in 2009. This shows that the UK increasingly highlights itself over the years. 
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‘Poorest’ and ‘poverty’ are ranked separately in the tables but are here mentioned 
together. In the top twenty words connected to development ‘poorest’ ranks third in 
1997. The rank of ‘poorest’ changed to fifth in 2000, ninth in 2006 and thirteenth in 
2009. Whereas ‘poverty’ ranks eighth in both 1997 and 2000, but changes to eleventh 
in 2006 and later goes up to rank tenth in 2009. Here it can be seen that the frequency 
of  both words fluctuate and therefore, the importance differs over the years. This is 
peculiar as ‘poverty’ goes from the top of the list to the bottom whereas the use of 
poverty is more or less at the same level throughout all four papers. 
Support, supporting and supported are considered as same word in our data and ranks 
fifth in 1997. Then drops to seventeenth in 2000, increases to sixth in 2006 and ends 
ranking fifth in 2009. This shows that the use of support, supporting and supported is 
almost the same in three of the white papers but drops dramatically in 2000. 
In 1997 ‘International’ ranks fourth in the top twenty words connected to 
development. The rank of ‘international’ changes to third in 2000 and 2006, and drops 
to seventh in 2009. This shows that ‘international’ is a highly important word in all 
four White Papers. 
 
‘Economic’, ‘growth’, ‘finance’ and ‘investment’ are ranked separately in the tables 
but are grouped together here. In the top twenty words connected to development 
‘economic’ ranks thirteenth in 1997. The rank of ‘economic’ changed to eighteenth in 
2000, and doesn’t appear in the top twenty in 2006 and 2009. Whereas ‘growth’ 
doesn’t rank in the top twenty in 1997 and 2000, but ranks fourteenth in 2006 and 
fifteenth in 2009. ‘Finance’ does not rank in the top twenty in 1997, 2006 and 2009, 
but ranks fifteenth in 2000. In 2000 ’investment’ ranks sixteenth, and does not appear 
in the top twenty in any of the other white papers. This seems to shows that the use of 
‘economic’ is being replaced by the use of ‘growth’ in 2006 and 2009. Further 
‘finance’ and ‘investment’ has a onetime appearance in 2000 and doesn’t seem to be 
important neither before nor after. 
Interestingly enough ‘Africa’ only ranks in the top twenty in one of the White Papers, 
this is in 2006 where it ranks seventh. No other continent ranks among the 20 most 
used words in any of the documents. 
‘People’ ranks in the top twenty in all of the white papers. In 1997 ‘people’ ranked 
ninth, tenth in 2000, fifth in 2006 and twelfth in 2009. This shows that the use of 
‘people’ is consistent throughout the documents. ‘Government’ and ‘governance’ are 
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ranked separately in the tables but are here mentioned together. In the top 20 words 
connected to development ‘government’ ranks seventh in 1997. The rank changed to 
sixth in 2000, does not rank in 2006, and ranks fifteenth 2009, whereas ‘governance’ 
ranks fifteenth in 2006, and does not appear in the rest of the White Papers. It seems 
that the use of ‘government’ is being replaced by ‘governance’ in the White Paper of 
2006. Finally ‘partnership’ ranks tenth in 1997 and fifteenth in 2006, and then drops 
of the top 20 in 2000 and 2009.  
 
 
Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century 
The first White Paper from 1997 was emitted of the newly established DFID under 
the New Labour administration. It provides a new national framework and tools for 
development policy that focus on several topics from aid donation to the promotion of 
development.  
 
It opens with the foreword of Prime Minister Tony Blair encouraging to “give back to 
our children what they deserve – a heritage of hope”  (DFID, 1997), acknowledging 
that is the duty of his generation to provide a better future. The sentence shows the 
use of cohesion as it creates a sense of rationality in the argument. This is done by the 
use of ‘give back’ as something can only be given back if it was taken in the first 
place. The sentence therefore tells the reader that ‘a heritage of hope’ was taken from 
‘our children’ and it is the UKs responsibility to give it back. Further the text creates 
coherence by the use of ‘our children’ the text also creates a relation to the reader as it 
creates a sense of inclusion to reach a common goal.  
In the foreword, Clare Short, the Secretary of State for International Development, 
shares the same concerns as Tony Blair. Although, she sends a hopeful message as 
she believes that there are possibilities to accomplish success.  
 
The different sections of the paper address diverse duties that the UK claims to have, 
under the phrase “We Shall”. By repeating ‘we shall’ throughout the paper, the text 
makes use of grammar by employing a simple sentence with increasing emphasis. 
This has the effect of pushing the reader to form the same opinion as the text, i.e. that 
it is a collective mission that all are devoted to. By utilising coherence through ‘we’ 
the indirect force over the reader becomes increasing through the text. Further, by 
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using the simple sentence “We shall” a discourse of morality is created. The morality 
discourse is underlined by the continued use of ‘we shall’ throughout the text. 
With this discursive frame as a reference, it is then plausible that Rwanda became the 
focus of the new office for development and its new approach, as it is one of the 
poorest countries in the world that was in extreme need of assistance to fight poverty. 
Morality conflicts with the lack of involvement of the international community in the 
Rwandan Genocide. If powerful states like the UK “shall” contribute to a country, 
then a country that deserves contribution is Rwanda.  
 
We Shall “Refocus our international development efforts” and “encouragement of 
economic growth”, through “international sustainable development targets and 
policies” with specific focus on poor people  (DFID, 1997, p. 6), for example. This 
White Paper introduces also the strategy that contemplates to “build partnerships with 
developing countries to strengthen the commitment to the elimination of poverty” with 
those “poorer countries who are also committed to [the development targets]”  
(DFID, 1997, s. 6). With the specific use of ‘partnership’ and ‘poorer countries’ the 
DFID creates a ideological power relation where they affirm their position as higher 
than the countries they aid financially. When the DFID encourage partnership it 
implies an equal power relation, but by defining the countries as ‘poorer’ an authority 
is exerted over the exact same countries. The use of ideology in the text makes the 
power relation between receiver and donor country very clear, and it creates 
hegemony where the UK and DFID always will be the stronger part in the 
relationship. 
From it’s creation the DFID gradually began to open offices in poor countries (though 
the British government had already been present in Rwanda since before releasing 
this paper). Rwanda is seen as one of those countries that are committed to the then-
development targets (today’s MDGs) and engage in partnership with the UK 
government for that purpose. 
 
The partnership tactic of the DFID, aiming at achieving jointly agreed targets, appears 
as a way to introduce a seemingly more fair relationship between aided and donors: 
mutually satisfactory goals instead of imposing conditionality’s on the receiver 
countries. This approach would also be embraced in the international level and seen in 
further documents such as the Paris Declaration (2005) and the Accra Agenda for 
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Action (2008), and the Millennium Development Goals (2000). The strategy appears 
as an alternative to the conditionality’s practiced in the 80’s and 90’s. In that period, 
economic policies were imposed within the frame of the Washington Consensus7 
while political reforms and top-down programmes were part of the aid policy. The 
policies implemented brought social and economic costs to Africa, and once that 
failure of these programmes designed by the World Bank, US treasury and IMF was 
acknowledged, the DAC Committee of the OECD designed a strategy aiming to 
redefine the aid relationship: donors should engage with aided in the form of 
partnership, providing more resources and at the same time supporting domestically 
owned policies  (Whitfield & Fraser, 2009, p. 77) 
 
The 1997 DFID White Paper has eliminated policies that did not have “poverty 
elimination as its central focus”, for example, the ATP8 (which in turn was misused). 
So “in order to avoid the abuses of the past” they “propose to build a new 
partnership between the relevant Government departments and British business”  
(DFID, 1997, p. 45). In the sentence force is used indirectly to impose the point that 
the earlier government was not able to avoid abuses of state funds. By hiding this 
criticism of the former government in to a sentence where cohesion is utilised to 
create a rational argument gives more power to the statement. This speaks also, of the 
intention of the new British government of reflecting a new approach, breaking with 
practices of the past.  
In regards to trade, the White Paper strongly encourages multilateral liberalisation, the 
removal of international trade barriers and investments as a way to promote economic 
growth, as well as the integration of the developing countries into the WTO. It should 
“reach the least developed countries, and the poorest people, and lead to sustainable 
development”  (DFID, 1997, p. 58).  
 In addition, the paper promotes the creation of the conditions to attract beneficial 
private investment to developing countries, such as political stability, transparent and 
accountable government and the prevention of corruption  (DFID, 1997, pp. 58-
62).“Political stability both within and between states is a necessary pre-condition !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Term introduced in 1989 to a package of economic policies designed in Washington DC by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and the US Treasury Department, to be implemented 
in developing countriesin the 90’s.!
8 Aid and Trade Provision (ATP). Promoted by business and the Department of Trade and Industry, 
this mechanism enabled aid to be linked to non-concessionary export credits, with both aid and export 
credits tied to procurement of British goods and services (Barder, 2005)!
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for the elimination of poverty” (DFID, 1997, p. 67), therefore the use UK resources to 
promote the political stability that prevents violent conflict and the consequences of 
social division, displacement of population, human rights and thus security in whole 
regions. 
In this issue Rwanda is particularly sensitive: The recent history of violence rooted in 
inequality and fragmentation makes of Rwanda a very instable country. It is widely 
acknowledged that one of the reasons for Rwanda’s poverty is rooted in the political 
instability of the country, as the disputes between groups were (and continue to be) a 
struggle for the share of power. At that point, this situation of Rwanda a case where 
the possibilities for eliminating poverty depend on the capacity of building a political 
environment that in turn, will lead to stability. !
 
Eliminating World Poverty: Making globalization work for the poor 
Being the first paper approaching globalisation among the biggest and most 
influential donors of the system, it takes a positive approach to this phenomenon, 
suggesting it can be managed so poverty is “systemically reduced”  (DFID, 2000, p. 
12).“The new millennium offers a real opportunity to eliminate world poverty. This is 
the greatest moral challenge facing our generation” said Prime Minister Tony Blair 
in the foreword of the document  (DFID, 2000, p. 6). The use of the simple sentence 
‘real opportunity’ grammar is used to create cohesion and a sense of rationality 
behind the statement. A ‘real opportunity’ implies that before the conditions were not 
there to eliminate poverty, therefore the DFID could not be made accountable for not 
reaching the goals put forth in the White Paper from 1997. Further, the ‘real 
opportunity’ is underlined by ‘the new millennium’. With the use of intertextuality the 
text is linked to the newly formed UN MDGs.  
 
The paper makes a differentiation of how globalisation could contribute to solve 
problems, but also of how it can deepen them in case of not being properly addressed. 
Furthermore, it focuses on the importance of globalisation, including the International 
Development Targets set in the international level.  
From this paper it is very obvious that the UK aimed to create a discourse of them 
being a leading country in aiding and assisting others to get out of poverty, but also as 
a fundamental actor at the global level: 
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“We have spent the last three years working to achieve these objectives. We 
now have unprecedented consensus – across the UN system, the IMF and 
World Bank, most Regional Development Banks, leaders of developing 
countries, the G8 and the OECD” – Clare Short  (DFID, 2000, p. 7).  
 
In this quote Clare Shorts further underlines the discourse of the UK being a leading 
nation in the international community. This is done by asserting the power relations 
where it is made to seem the UK has a great position in the international community, 
and is capable of influencing powerful institutions.  
The international level is addressed in this paper much more than in the others, but it 
is not a coincidence. The beginning of the new millennium brought about a positive 
and hopeful discourse of globalisation around the world, and the development 
dialogue was not an exception. The International Development Targets became the 
UN Millennium Development Goals (with objectives to be accomplished by 2015) 
that in the future will work as the overall reference at national and international level. 
 
The paper addresses key commitments, in which “the UK government will”: “work 
with others to manage globalisation so poverty is systematically reduced, promote 
equitable and sustainable growth”  (DFID, 2000, p. 10). Focus on global research, 
sharing knowledge and technologies to promote health and education, hey aim at 
promoting effective government (through less corruption and conflict, and more 
respect for human rights) and markets “that work for poor people and meet the 
challenge of globalization”  (DFID, 2000, p. 10). This focus on effective governance, 
(which will be the most important topic of the next paper) explains the support given 
by the UK government to Kagame, as he has been portrayed as a political leader with 
a true commitment to improve the situation of his country, with particular focus on 
combating corruption and preventing conflict, and articulating a private sector that 
can take the country out of the dependency on aid. This is also in lines with the UK’s 
government intention of promoting markets and harnessing private finance: “to make 
developing countries attractive for private financial flows (…) work to strengthen the 
global financial system (…) encourage corporate social responsibility and more 
investment by national and transnational companies  (DFID, 2000, p. 10).  
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But the UK’s view is not only based on the local level, they claim to have a plan that 
can benefit everyone. It will allow the UK government capture gains, supporting open 
and rules-based trading system with equality and voice of the developing countries. 
 
In addition, another important commitment is made in this paper as it “increases the 
development assistance to 0.33% as a proportion of GNP by 2003/04, and continue to 
make progress towards the 0.7% UN target” (DFID, 2000, p. 11), aiming at 
increasing the proportion of GNP provided to poor countries in general, and continue 
to untie UK aid. Other countries are encouraged by the UK to take the same policies. 
This statement depicts once more the discourse of the UK as a leading nation in the 
international community. The UK is made to be a leader in development assistance as 
they aim to reach the UN target, and at the same time makes it seems as if they are a 
leading actor in this attempt.  
 
The paper continues by introducing internal changes (a Development Bill to replace 
the Overseas Development and Co-operation Act, office that had already been 
replaced by the DFID), and measures of foreign policy such as provide debt relief to 
countries committed to reduce poverty. In the same way promotes changes at a global 
scale to improve the international aid delivery system “making it “stronger, more 
open and accountable” and “in which poor people and countries have a more 
effective voice”  (DFID, 2000, p. 11). Through this, the UK establishes its hegemony 
and power over other countries, because the words used in this discourse makes the 
DFID appear as generous by offering this opportunity to them. An opportunity like 
that can only be offered by a powerful and leading nation which in turn underlines 
once more, the discourse they are trying to form as the UK as a leader. 
 
Eliminating World Poverty: Making governance work for the poor 
The paper opens its preface with the words “The scandal of poverty…”by Hilary 
Benn, Secretary of State for International Development (DFID, 2006, p. III)  
He believes that “development is all about freedom”. This idea, he argues, is in line 
with the economist Amartya Sen’s who argues that “millions upon millions of our 
human family are living imprisoned: by economic poverty, by political tyranny, by 
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sickness and disease, by ignorance, and by oppression and violence”.  (DFID, 2006, 
p. III) 
By mentioning the arguments of Amartya Sen, the text shows intertextuality. This is 
obvious, and Hilary Benn reproduces Sen’s statements and links them with both his 
own opinions and the entire white paper. The two statements above are in the same 
way a continuation of the morality discourse that was found in the to previous white 
papers. When development is linked with freedom, the work that DFID does become 
morally correct, as it is the same as creating freedom where it is lacking.  
In the paper it is evident that it is not only the morality discourse that is being further 
developed, the format is also completely redesigned. The format has changed from 
being a formal communication to become a narrative of the good DFID story and the 
lives of the inhabitants of poor countries. Moreover it includes a glossary of terms of 
development and a section calling for participation by regular people in a specific 
section called ‘what can you do?’. Pictures of poor people, their life stories complete 
the emotional tenor of the document. It calls for the public’s awareness of the global 
problem of poverty by utilising all of this new text structure. Further the text calls for 
the public’s engagement, on one side, by asking directly the question ‘what can you 
do?’. On the other side, it does it indirectly, by using photos and personal stories to 
form the readers’ opinion in a way that is favourable for the DFID. 
Acknowledging some successes such as doubling aid since 1997; committing for the 
first time ever to a timetable – 2013 – for giving 0.7% of GNI in development aid; 
writing off 100% of the debt of world’s poorest nations, among others, the paper 
recognizes all the problems that need to be addressed and lays focus on the role of 
governments for solving them.  (DFID, 2006, pp. V-VI) 
The paper of 2006 appears in a period of discontent of the way in which globalization 
was managed by the institutions of the west (at international and state level) was 
expressed around the world. “A conundrum of criticism” as described by Stubbs & 
Underhill (2006) “due to a range of cataclysmic events – financial collapses, radical 
market reforms and clashes between demonstrators and police at international 
summits”  (Stubbs & Underhill, 2006, p. 66) and the formation of organizations such 
as World Social Forum to think about alternatives to neo-liberal globalization.  
Unlike the previous paper, in which globalization was address in a hopeful sense and 
its downsides barely acknowledged, this paper takes a critical instance, especially 
towards financial institutions and the Washington Consensus. Touching upon UN, the 
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World Bank and IMF, the WTO and the EU, the DFID says that these were created in 
other circumstances, “institutions built for a world very different from today’s” and 
therefore “it is natural that we should look at the multilateral system critically” 
(DFID, 2006, p. VIII) and they do by referring often to the need of updating the 
international system and making it ready to 21st century. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that the announcement of the field policies for this period seem to be designed with 
less adherence to the structural adjustment programs conducted by the IMF and 
World Bank that “proved to be ill-suited for developing countries” (Stiglitz, 2005 as 
cited in  Webster, 2008, p. 6) 
 
Moreover, about the system of global governance, it is intended to help create a safer 
world, for example, by building capacity to deal with conflicts. Furthermore, the 
paper deposits the responsibility of poverty elimination on the states: “Ultimately, it is 
within individual countries that poverty will be eliminated. Nation states are central 
to the change that is needed” (DFID, 2006, pp. VIII-IX) Each country needs to decide 
its own economic and social priorities, and the best people to hold governments to 
account are those who live in the country and are most affected by its decisions. 
(DFID, 2006, p. IX). This idea of increasing the capacity of ownership of the 
receiving countries is not out of context, it is also a product of the unsuccessful of the 
development policies imposed to third world countries, and which is explicitly 
reflected (and represent the main idea) of the OECD’s Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness (2005). This reflects both a use of intertextuality by using the arguments 
and wording of an international document important for development policies in this 
period. It also reflects an ideological shift that is happening in the international 
community at the time. The ideological shift explicitly puts emphasis on local 
ownership and thereby local responsibility for development to happen. It seems 
therefore not to be a coincidence that the head of the DFID opens the document by 
reflecting on the importance of “freedom” and not “liberty”, and although there is a 
willingness to support the poor countries, the responsibility lays also in the hands of 
the local governments. 
 
“This White Paper sets out how the UK Government will work with others to deliver 
the promises of 2005”. (DFID, 2006, p. 6) and also those promises that were already 
delivered. In that year, African leaders committed themselves to improve their 
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governance, development policies and allocation of aid. The G8, UN World Summit, 
the WTO and EU countries made a great offer in exchange such as cancelling debts, 
improve access to international markets, help poor countries in conflict, fight 
corruption and climate change. They promised also an extra amount of US$50 billion 
for improving health, promote growth and make aid more efficient  (DFID, 2006, pp. 
3-4) With focus on the poor countries in sub-Saharan Africa and in South Asia.  
In regards to the accomplishment of the MDGs, the paper acknowledges that  
“Most of the improvements have been in Asia, particularly in East Asia. Some 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa are making progress, but the region as a whole 
will not meet any of the MDGs. (…) On current trends, by 2015, over 90% of the 
world’s poor will live in sub-Saharan African and South Asia.” (DFID, 2006, p. 
6) This is a serious statement that compromises the strategy and can eventually 
evidence a big failure. In regards to Africa, they include some examples of 
countries where aid has given good results: These are Mozambique, Rwanda, 
Uganda, Ghana. For example: “In Rwanda, in the ten years since the genocide, 
aid – over 15% of national income a year – helped reduce poverty from 70% in 
1994 to under 60% in 2001(…) “So aid works – but the amount of aid and the 
way it is used has a significant impact on how effective it is”  (DFID, 2006, p. 
13). Here the text make use direct force by using grammar through the short 
sentence ‘So aid does work’. The statement is supported by the results that DFID 
presents on Rwanda’s development after a horrific genocide, and thereby leaving 
the reader with the impression that if DFID have create development in an 
impossible country. This further underlines the morality discourse that was shown 
earlier. 
Rwanda, although not meeting the MDGs, appears to be a country that has 
achieved a degree of success and has a promising future due to good governance, 
which is the focus of the DFID for this period. Success that is even more valuable 
given the conflict and devastation Rwanda is recovering from in a short time. 
This characteristic in particular, is relevant for the priorities in the discourse of 
the UN’s MDGs (2000) and the OECD (and the Paris Declaration) and even 
more, in times where the whole system of aid is being challenged by scepticism. 
Setting effective states at the centre of development, the overall priority of this paper 
is “building states that work for poor people”. This paragraph summarizes the 
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approach accurately: 
 
“First, good governance is fundamental. Governance is about the 
capability of governments to get things done, how they respond to the 
needs and rights of their citizens, and how, in turn, people can hold their 
governments to account. In short, governance is about politics – the way 
in which citizens and government relate to each other.” (DFID, 2006, p. 
10) 
The emphasis is again put on local ownership and responsibility, this time it is 
‘good governance’ with the guidance of DFID. The use of ‘good governance’ 
suggests a colonial discourse where DFID becomes the mechanism to secure that 
‘people can hold their government to account’. As people cannot hold a 
dictatorship accountable for its actions the logical answer seems to be liberal 
democracy. This paper has clearly moved from an economic approach to 
development, to lay focus on the social and political issues. Although this is not 
shown in the vocabulary used in the text. “Politics” itself is not a word that 
appears much in the document, and when it does, it is often used with politics as 
governance, or as the relation between the people, or seeing the government as 
administration, but not as a matter of power: 
 
“In the end, governance – from the global right down to the village level – 
is about people and their relationships one with another more than it is 
about formal institutions. What makes the biggest difference to the quality 
of governance is active involvement by citizens- the thing we know as 
politics” (DFID, 2006, p. 9) 
 
States must provide economic growth, but also basic services such as education 
and health, provide an open and participatory political environment, and ensure 
that people’s rights are protected.  
In this regard one could argue that the UK takes this position, as part of this 
approach of making the papers more appealing to the readers in a period of 
discontent with the global economic order and the decisions made by politicians.  
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In connection to “good governance”, the paper incorporates the discourse of 
development as security. The discourse shows in the simple sentence  
“Promoting peace and security”, which is also one of the duties of the state 
because “insecurity and conflict keep people poor” (DFID, 2006, pp. 44-45). 
This is fundamental for the country level but also for the global level. Promoting 
peace, stability and security brings not only the countries out of poverty, but also 
security for the rest of the world. Thereby development in the developing world is 
directly connected with global security. Due to the interconnectedness of 
countries, conflicts and its consequences transcend the near geographical 
boundaries but also to countries further away as shown by the 9/11 attack on the 
US. For that matter, Rwanda is a country that can show how to overcome these 
issues, and it is portrayed as a role model. On the other side, the risk of conflict 
there is latent and can break out at any point, being a justification for the 
continuous foreign assistance. Furthermore, instability in Rwanda would directly 
affect Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
In addition, the White Paper states that “the UK will Press the World Bank, IMF 
and others to avoid economic policy conditionality in such areas as privatisation 
and trade liberalisation” and “Support developing country calls for a stronger 
say at the World Bank and IMF.”  (DFID, 2006, p. 114). This emphasises the 
discourse of the UK being a leading nation in the international community, so 
much so that they are able to ‘press’ powerful international organisations. They 
also refer to other organizations in the system on diffirent issues, as they “aim to 
work with others, and use our resources and influence, to push for change in the 
international system” (DFID, 2006, p. 11). Therby Supporting regional 
organizations such as the African Development Bank and the African Union,  
(DFID, 2006, p. XI), and also consider it necessary to work closer with non-DAC 
donors such as China and India. (DFID, 2006, p. 118). This is a very interesting 
approach, as the DFID is recognising the new trends and actors in development, 
accepting the importance of these countries as emerging donors, and to some 
extent that they are potentially important actors in the dialogue for development 
strategies at the international level. Given the discourse of being leaders in 
development assistance, it is reasonable to think that the UK can also intend to 
generate good relationships with these “alternative” donors. Thereby making the 
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shift in the ideological power balance as little as possible and through that 
securing the current hegemony. 
It refers often to the MDGs (which are specifically described in the paper, with an 
analysis of their current status) as a frame of reference to which measure results 
and lead actions, for example, when talking about the progress being made: 
“…progress has been uneven. On current trends, many of the MDGs will not be 
met” (DFID, 2006, p. 6) as well as the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness as 
at the global framework for actions  (DFID, 2006, p. 119). Last but not least, this 
paper incorporates a section called “What can you do?” where they suggest that 
people “can make a difference” which is clearly one more sign of efforts also 
made in the previous paper, to get public support for the UK’s role and actions 
abroad in regards to International Development !
Eliminating World Poverty: Building our common future 
The extensive paper of 2009 has very interesting features. From the initial foreword 
by the Prime Minister Gordon Brown, the economic crisis is recognised as a systemic 
threat to development, but it states that it will not stop the UK’s commitment. “Even 
in the most difficult times, this government will never retreat from the promises it has 
made to the poorest” – Gordon Brown  (DFID, 2009, p. 5) 
As a consequence of these ‘difficult times’ is that the department aims at 
“Transforming [their] impact and Ensuring Value for Money” which is important in 
times when “public finances are tight it is even more pressing”. Further the public 
can ensure that aid is “not being wasted”  (DFID, 2009, p. 125), and for that matter 
the DFID “will expand [their] efforts to crack down on corruption” (DFID, 2009, p. 
8). It seems as if the DFID introduces a new discourse here. This is the discourse of 
‘ensuring value for money’ in development assistance. By using a simple sentence 
like ‘Ensuring Value for Money’ the text employs cohesion to create a rational 
argument. The point is further underlined by the use of coherence by relating to the 
reader through recognising the public reality of the global economic crisis that has 
made the public finances tight.  
 
The Secretary of State for International Development goes on to describe some 
achievements in the international dialogue, such as “playing a key role in the design 
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of the MDGs” (which are presented one by one in detail) and remarks that “we made 
sure the poor were at the heart of the global response to the economic crisis” (DFID, 
2009, p. 6). He goes on to declare, “DFID is now widely acknowledged, not just as the 
best aid administration in the world, but as an outstanding development agency. 
People in this country should be proud” (DFID, 2009, p. 7). This statement is a clear 
reflection of the discourse of United Kingdom being a leading nation in development 
assistance. The discourse at this point of time is very clear throughout the white 
paper: a proof to the British citizens of effectiveness and leadership of their 
government in matters of development assistance. And it is not coincidence that it 
happens in 2009, just months after the collapse of the financial system in 2008 that 
led to the economic crisis of global dimensions. The discourse is further underlined 
by establishing its hegemony and power relations with the use of ‘we made sure’, as 
to imply that the UK has great power and high position in the international 
community. Further it is insinuating that the UK uses their power and position to 
work for the good, thereby introducing the morality discourse again.  
The paper does not only renew the commitment previously made but also “charts new 
courses (…) takes us in new and fresh direction”  (DFID, 2009, p. 9). And because it 
is important “to be clearer about where the UK public resources are being spent” a 
new logo ‘UKaid’ is introduced with representative colours.  (DFID, 2009, p. 135) 
 
The document puts the UK as an actor interested in development not only for the 
moral duty, but also because of the benefits that alleviating poverty and its consequent 
problems can prevent problems in the UK. These are addressed as “common causes” 
and effectively highlight the discourse of development as security over the morality 
discourse.  
Sustainability must come with growth and it is important to tackle the environmental 
problems as it affects the world and also the UK: Promoting growth, jobs and a 
responsible private sector in poor countries “with a new focus on environmental 
sustainability” (DFID, 2009, p. 8), as “The UK is also being affected. Nine of the 
hottest years on record have been in the last 15 years”  (DFID, 2009, p. 47) 
This reflects the discourse of “value of the money”, stating that the money of the 
British people is being invested to their own benefit as well.  
“Development co-operation is not charity – it is a partnership of mutual respect, in a 
common interest. This approach recognises our interdependence and the 
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interdependence of our support to developing countries with other national 
objectives. Pursuing our common interest is not an add-on or an afterthought to 
British government policy – it is a common thread running through the way we 
approach global issues” (DFID, 2009, p. 18). By stating that development 
cooperation is ’not charity’, the ‘value for money’ discourse becomes evident again. It 
seems highly important for DFID to make clear what the UK gets in return for their 
development assistance. It gets further underlined by putting the morality discourse in 
the background and making clear that developments assistance cannot be seen as 
money not invested in the UKs best interest.  
A written testimony of this, is the Memorandum of Mutual Understanding initially 
signed by the British and Rwandan government in April 1999 (and which has been 
subject to revision, last time in 2012) where it shows “shared and individual 
commitments” in a frame of understanding and cooperation.  
(Government of Rwanda, Government of the UK, 1999) 
Another way to illustrate how aid can in return contribute to the UK’s own situation is 
by opening markets: “Faced with the reality of interdependence, development is not 
only morally right, it is wise”  (DFID, 2009, p. 17). “Our common prosperity depends 
on shared, sustainable growth. Britain’s fastest growing export markets are low and 
middle income countries”  (DFID, 2009, p. 16), therefore they want to help to those 
developing the right market and business models that can contribute with the growth  
(DFID, 2009, p. 24). Here the morality discourse is being put in the background again 
and argues that the way to get value for development money is to export a ‘business 
model’ that can help the developing countries to achieve growth. This shows a 
colonial discourse that implies that the UK can replicate its own system of liberal 
democracy and economy through development. 
 
An additional obstacle to this desired growth, is conflict: “Conflict and weak 
governance do not only cause poverty but also act as a brake on future growth” 
(DFID, 2009, p. 15) therefore it is a goal to build “Peaceful States and Societies” 
(DFID, 2009, p. 69) which is not only a matter of governance, it is also political. In 
the previous paper, this would be an issue of governance and not politics. The 
discourse of this paper is to put politics on the spotlight again, as a tool for social 
transformation. In this way they aim to contribute to the UK’s own security by 
creating more effective states in poorer countries, that could make it more difficult for 
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terrorist organisations to develop  (DFID, 2009, p. 17). This shows the discourse of 
development assistance being able to create security for the UK. 
DFID believe that “Conflict and fragility are inherently political”. (DFID, 2009, p. 
70) As it is inevitably a matter of how “…power and resources are shared in society, 
between ethnic groups, social classes or men and women. Their solutions must be 
rooted in politics” (DFID, 2009, p. 70). Within this idea, Rwanda fits once more as 
one of the cases that the UK needs to work on if they want to create a better world, as 
ethnic conflict is at the heart of the problem of instability in Rwanda. Further analysis 
of this paper can explain also, why the UK government through the DFID supports 
the approach taken Paul Kagame on this regard. 
For the purpose of supporting governments that face the challenge of overcoming 
conflict, the DFID will take measures such as allocating at least half of the UK 
bilateral funding on fragile states. Peace and security become then an essential part of 
the development partnerships and “increase support for democratic politics, 
including peaceful, free and fair elections” (DFID, 2009, p. 71). This shows the 
colonial discourse is still evident in DFID. 
This approach considers ‘access to security and justice’ as a basic service that 
deserves direct project support  (DFID, 2009, p. 74) and about 5% of budget support 
will be allocated to build accountability by supporting parliaments, civil society, and 
the media that can make governments accountable (DFID, 2009, p. 127).  
 
Furthermore, they aim at “Building understanding of global interdependence in the 
UK” for which they will create “Stronger partnerships with the private sector” to 
promote the incomes that allow the financing of basic services and elements required 
to eliminate poverty. In the international level, the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) make great emphasis on the 
need of creating partnerships such as “Building More Effective and Inclusive 
Partnerships for Development” (OECD, 2005/2008, p. 16). These are examples of 
intertextuality in the text, as it reproduces the discourse being held at the international 
level with the Accra Agenda for Action. The agenda repeatedly stresses on the need 
of developing the private sector to lift the country out of poverty. Further the Accra 
Agenda for Action is promoting inclusive partnerships that can make the most out of 
the relationship with the private sector (funding, knowledge, among others). These 
types of partnerships are necessary “to support developing countries’ efforts to build 
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for the future”  (OECD, 2005/2008, p. 17). Therefore, the DFID will launch strategies 
that can contribute to the creation of jobs and innovation in ways of financing help  
(DFID, 2009, p. 135).  
 
DFID makes an interesting choice vocabulary in this white paper compared to the 
previous. Unlike the previous papers (and specially the one from 1999) the view of 
the world is addressed as “international” and “interdependent”: “We live in an 
increasingly interdependent world”  (DFID, 2009, p. 6), an idea that is repeated 
throughout the paper and used to describe the relationship in the system. It remarks a 
difference with the discourse of the previous paper: in this one there is almost no 
mention to the word globalization. Based on the fact that the paper was written in the 
period of global economic crisis there is a reason to believe that this choice of words 
is to avoid the link “globalization/economic crisis”. This becomes even more evident 
in the second part of the analysis, when the speeches of Clare Short are introduced. 
 
Deepening the rather critical position taken in previous paper about the multilateral 
institutions, the UK government claims that the contribution to organisations like the 
UN, World Bank and EU “must be matched by reforms”  (DFID, 2009, p. 8) going as 
far as using word such as “pressuring the IMF (…) and world Bank” (DFID, 2009, 
pp. 25-27). This further underlines that the discourse of the UK being a leading nation 
with power and influence to ‘pressure’ as powerful an economic organisation as the 
IMF.  
The paper goes on to criticize the old Washington Consensus and its structural 
adjustments programs that were not applied taking into consideration the distinctive 
characteristics of each country. Instead, the UK proposes that every country will be 
responsible for pursuing its own path, identify issues and possible solutions  (DFID, 
2009, p. 38) !! &
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Discourses&in&DFIDs&Policy&Towards&Rwanda&
 
In this section the second working question,’ What discourses can be shown in DFIDs 
policy towards Rwanda in the years from1999 to 2004?’ will be answered. 
a critical discourse analysis will be done on the three documents that show the British 
development policy towards Rwanda. The documents are: Rwanda: Country Strategy 
Paper 1999 (1999), Speech by Clare Short at the Labour Party Conference 2000 
(2000) and Rwanda Country Assistance Plan 2003-2006 (2004). First the vocabulary 
of all the documents will collectively be analysed through the produced word-
frequency data. Second, each document will be analysed individually. It introduces a 
description of the main pillars of every paper and highlights how the discourse has 
changed in the period from 1999-2004.  
 
In this section of the critical discourse analysis we have found that a colonial 
discourse is evident in both 1999 and 2000, but doesn’t show prominently in 2004. 
The colonial discourse seems to be replaces by a discourse of trade-off between 
democracy and economic development. The trade-off discourse is only evident in 
2004 and may be explained by the lack of results of democratic development in 
Rwanda. Further a discourse of the UK being a leading nation in development 
assistance is clearly evident in both Clare Shorts speech from 2000 and in 2004, but 
doesn’t seems to be supported in the earlier 1999 document. Lastly the morality 
discourse only appears in 2000. 
Vocabulary of the Documents connected to Rwanda  
The use of vocabulary in the three documents connected to Rwanda is similar but the 
frequency of the individual words in each document changes. The frequency 
determines the position of the word within the ranking of the 20 most used words 
connected to development. This part of the analysis is based on the data from tables 5 
through 7 that are placed in the annex. 
 
In 1999 ‘government’ ranks second in the top twenty words connected to 
development. The rank of ‘government’ changes to sixth in 2000, and first in 2004. 
This shows that ‘government’ is a highly important word in all three texts, although it 
descends a bit in rank in 2000. ‘Social’ and ‘people’ are ranked separately in the 
tables but are here mentioned together. In the top twenty words connected to 
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development ‘social’ ranks ninth in 1999 and sixteenth in 2004, but does not appear in 
2000. The  position of ‘people’ is fifth in 2000, but is not within the top twenty in the 
two other texts. It seems as if the use of ‘social’ is being replaced by ‘people’ is in the 
speech by Clare Short in 2000.!
 
‘International’ ranks seventh in 1999. It goes up to rank third in 2000 and does not 
appear in 2004. 
With this type of analysis of the texts, it can be seen that the word fluctuates in 
frequency and therefore importance over the years, this case is peculiar as it goes 
from a middle rank to the top of the list, and then completely drops off the top twenty.  
 
In the top twenty words connected to development, the term ‘economic’ ranks fifth in 
1999. Whereas it does not appear in 2000, it reappears and ranks ninth in 2004. 
‘Poverty’ on the other hand, ranks eleventh in 1999, climbs to second in 2000 and 
then drops to sixth in 2004. This shows that the use of ‘poverty’ in this period is more 
steady then the use of ‘economic’ 
 
Finally ‘support, supporting and supported’ is taken to be that same word in our data 
and ranks fourth in 1999. Then the use drops to tenth in 2000, and then climbs to third 
in 2004. This shows that the word is highly important in the two reports but not as 
much in the Clare Shorts speech. 
 
Rwanda: Country Strategy Paper 1999 
This paper is from 1999 and presents DFIDs Rwanda strategy for the next three years. 
Country Strategy Papers are made for all countries the DFID provide development 
assistance programmes. The paper reflects the strategy towards Rwanda framed by 
the White Paper on International Development of 1997, which assesses that the UK’s 
policy is to concentrate the most efforts in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. At this point 
of time, Rwanda had to be considered “a special case for assistance” and receive 
budget support, according to the DFID.  (DFID, 1999, p. 1) 
 
A very important section of this paper is the “Understanding on the Development 
Partnership Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
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Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda” made in the 
context of the partnership created to support Rwanda’s National Development Vision 
2020 “which aims to build a stable, prosperous and democratic Rwanda, and the 
basis on which both Governments will co-operate”. (DFID, 1999, p. 9) By forming a 
simple sentence, ‘prosperous and democratic Rwanda’, the colonial discourse can be 
spotted. The discourse is supported by the DFID establishing its policies as the 
mechanism for the right change and indicates that they know what is best for Rwanda.  
The mission of the development assistance to Rwanda seems to be with the aim of 
pushing Rwanda to develop a liberal democracy because this is the way of securing 
future prosperity for the country. For that purpose the government of Rwanda has to 
commit in order to receive that assistance from the UK. Although Rwanda is given 
power and ownership by the Paris Declaration, it still has to be compatible with the 
colonial discourse of the UK as seen in their memorandum of understanding. 
 
With the genocide as en antecedent, the UK government recognises the challenges in 
working in a country that has recently been devastated by the genocide. Therefore, 
national reconciliation and unity, reconstruction and building up capacity are essential 
for even starting long-term plans. Social stability is highly desired, and “Rwanda 
faces a period of transition during which social stability must be consolidated; 
national reconciliation take place; and conditions for longer term growth must be 
established” (DFID, 1999, p. 1). Under this premise, the DFID’s colonial discourse 
can explain why they intend to have a long-time presence in Rwanda, as the 
challenges ahead require long-term solutions and actions. 
 
The UK is not working alone as there is an engagement of the international financial 
institutions that consider that Rwanda is a test case, where they intended to test new 
policies on post conflict countries. UK shows in this paper that they exert some 
degree of influence in these international organisations in order to increase support to 
Rwanda:  
 
“We have built very strong links with the World Bank and IMF and have 
joined them in leading the effort to mobilise support for Rwanda. Although 
other donors have larger project portfolios, DFID is a major bilateral 
contributor of budgetary support. We have played a prominent role in 
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discussions in multilateral fora on Rwanda and have taken a lead in 
convening two informal donor meetings. ”  (DFID, 1999, p. 6)  
 
In the context of the paper, these lines suggest that the DFID had gradually increased 
its presence in Rwanda, as for in the beginning of the reconstruction UK was neither 
the major contributor nor the sole leader in designing the strategy for Rwanda. This 
stands in contrast to the discourse of the UK being a leading nation in development 
assistance. The discourse seems to not be completely formed yet and suggests that the 
power relations between donors in Rwanda at that point did not match with the 
discourse of the DFID. This can also be seen in the use of ‘joined’ in connection to 
the World Bank and IMF. This shows that the DFID is not in a position to dominate 
the international organisations on the specific subject of Rwanda at this point in time. 
 
Later on, the paper says that the DFID’s plan regarding Rwanda’s economic reform 
has acquired importance and gave more recognition to the UK as it “has persuaded 
the IMF to consider relaxing the fiscal stance particularly on the primary budget, 
thus giving Rwanda the opportunity to build the social and political capital necessary 
to foster reconciliation and to prevent a return to conflict”  (DFID, 1999, p. 7) here it 
is important to notice the use of ‘pressured’ in connection to the IMF. This further 
shows that there is no basis for the discourse of the UK as a leading nation in the 
context of development assistance to Rwanda.  
 
In regards to the status of Rwanda, the UK has been active in making this country be 
accepted as a “special case for international assistance”, but “some donors are 
reluctant to move the focus of their assistance from emergency to development”  
(DFID, 1999, p. 1). Here it seems that DFID introduces the morality discourse as the 
reason for their position, but when reflecting on the leading nation discourse that is 
surprisingly lacking in this paper. It is clear that the UK mentions the attitude of other 
donors to mark a difference between the UK’s solidarity and others’ reluctance or 
lack of interest. However, what the DFID does not explain here is why other countries 
are reluctant to engage more with Rwanda. Hayman states accordingly that “for 
Canada and Germany, Rwanda numbers amongst priority countries for poverty 
reduction and long-term support”. Furthermore, “The Netherlands and Switzerland, 
on the other hand, accord Rwanda ‘special status’, indicating that all “these donors 
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have a strong desire to engage with Rwanda, but concerns about governance issues 
prevent full partner status being given”  (Hayman, 2006, pp. 48-49). It seems as in 
DFIDs eagerness to establish itself as a leading nation it makes a trade-off on 
democracy and shifts focus on a kind of first step of development that doesn’t have to 
include democratic development.  
 
In UK government’s opinion, being a special case is necessary for Rwanda to pursue 
the development policies that can contribute to take the country out of poverty, such 
as budget support. Support is fundamental for the government of Rwanda, as it has 
shifted focus from emergency management to economic growth and poverty 
reduction. The UK recognises that “without substantial, sustained and flexible support 
from the donor community it will not be possible for the Government to manage the 
difficult transition from conflict to peace and stability”  (DFID, 1999, p. 9). The 
budget support to Rwanda is the key strategy, and it is the result of a strong working 
partnership with the Rwandan Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning since 
1994.  (DFID, 1999, p. 5) 
There is optimism for expanding partnerships with Rwandan government, both 
governments “the key role of the private sector in development” and a process of 
privatisation will be encouraged “in order to unlock the employment and revenue 
potential of the under-performing state enterprises and to broaden the ownership and 
control of productive assets”.  (DFID, 1999, p. 5) 
The paper shows optimism but also prudence in many ways. In this regard, stability is 
also necessary for the UK to open a market there. “Rwanda is not a traditional 
market for the UK private sector and inward investment decisions are likely to be 
influenced by the ongoing insecurity in the region”. (DFID, 1999, p. 6)  
Although Rwanda may not be a country that can represent a big interest to the UK (as 
it is not a potential great market for making business) one can argue that the 
possibility of opening a market that allows allocating British companies is always 
interesting for a country that repeatedly has promoted liberalisation. This becomes 
even more plausible when looking into future value for money discourse in 
connection with the global economic crisis that was shown in the first section of the 
analysis.  
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Nonetheless, stability is important for the region of the Great Lakes and is a door 
open for relationships with others furthermore a conflict in Rwanda can easily affect 
the situation in Congo, which is a bigger market and not least importantly, a mineral-
rich country. The strategy tells that there are “good relationships with a number of 
other East African countries including Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania, to whom 
Rwanda is looking to develop trading and economic partnerships” and finally, the 
UK claims to have “excellent working relationships with, and share the policy aims 
of, the international financial institutions” that are mobilizing funds for the African 
country  (DFID, 1999, p. 5). This again shows that the discourse of the UK being a 
leading nation does not have merit in the case of Rwanda. The vocabulary used is soft 
and does not imply the use of force to impose the discourse on the reader.  
 
Sustainable growth can only happen if this region is stable, according to the ideas of 
this strategy and the White Paper. Therefore, the conflict in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo where some irregular forces ex-FAR (former Rwandan Army) operate are 
an obstacle. Long-term stability is: 
 
 “…also depend on Rwanda’s capacity to build national unity and develop 
democratic processes in a society where trust has been destroyed by the 
genocide and where the culture of impunity remains. Given this background, 
combined with the legacy of decades of divisive and exclusionary rule, such a 
task will take time”  (DFID, 1999, p. 3). 
 
By remarking that these tasks will take time, the DFID indicates that the partnership 
with Rwanda is long-standing and the British presence in this African country is 
likely to continue. This underlines the colonial discourse of DFID being the 
mechanism that can export and replicate liberal democracy in Rwanda. Further the 
text uses cohesion to create a rational argument as to why democratic development 
may be slow and thereby also excusing why Kagame’s pace in solving this issue with 
neighbouring. This point seems to support our argument that the UK is making a trade 
of between development in the present and leaving democratic development to a later 
time.  
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Speech by Clare Short at the Labour Party Conference 
The Speech was presented by Clare Short at the Labour Party Conference on 26th of 
September 2000. At this point in time Clare Short is the Secretary of State for 
International Development. The speech puts the DFID strategies into political 
perspective, it is of significance for the domestic politics of the UK, but she never 
mentions the DFID – she speaks of the government instead. It is a motivating speech, 
indicating that the Labour Party takes a stand on development in a way that the 
Conservatives would not do. 
 
The speech begins with the acknowledgment of the fear of the effects of globalisation 
and the disconformity expressed by the public about the global economic institutions. 
She draws a parallelism with the Industrial Revolution, which inspired the tradition of 
the Labour Party of commitment to share the wealth: “Today, the challenge is to 
manage globalisation for all -to share the new wealth across the world and usher in a 
new era of massive poverty reduction”  (Short, 2000).  
This was said prior to the 2006 DFID white paper, which abandoned the pro-
globalisation discourse and focused on governance, acknowledging the importance of 
international dependency but laying the responsibility on governments for their own 
success or failure. 
 
In a critical position, she expresses the need for “stronger, not weaker, international 
institutions. A World Bank and IMF focused on the systematic reduction of poverty. 
And a World Trade Organisation that is more responsive to the three quarters of its 
membership that are developing countries, and that puts in place a fairer 
international trading system”.  (Short, 2000). Here she uses the morality discourse to 
underline her statement, and stresses it further by using cohesion in mentioning that 
the developing countries represents three quarters of the members in the World Trade 
Organisation. This build up the argument for a system that is more fair, make these 
members seem rational, and effectively creates coherence with the reader as it pulls 
on the democratic thought of influence. In addition, she reminds the increasing 
protagonism of the UK in development (as seen in other types of communication such as 
the White Paper) as she states that “over the last 3 years we have worked to improve 
the effectiveness of the international development effort by getting all parts of the 
international system committed to meeting the international development targets”  
(Short, 2000). 
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Later on, she states that it is necessary to have a more effective UN and stronger 
international effort to resolve the conflicts that keep countries poor “after the terrible 
failure in Rwanda”.  (Short, 2000). Short again uses the morality discourse to further 
DFIDs agenda by putting the blame of letting the genocide in Rwanda happen entirely 
on the UN and thereby playing up their own moral duty to assist Rwanda in the 
future. 
Rwanda appears as a very useful case for a political discourse when the lack of 
response and irresponsibility must be exemplified, especially when there is a public 
commitment by the UK under the Labour Party to help the country. 
Later on, after announcing an increase in the budget for development, she makes a 
very strong political statement when she makes a contrast with the politics of the 
Conservative Party: “Under the Tories the aid budget shrank and too often focused on 
Britain’s commercial and political interests”  (Short, 2000). She even brings up “the 
shame of the Pergau Dam9”.  (Short, 2000) And states that the Labour government has 
reversed the image inherited and “we are seen once again as a radical and influential 
player in the international system. All this and much more would be lost if we were 
ever to allow the Conservative Party to be elected to government again”.  (Short, 
2000) Here she clearly uses the discourse of the UK being a leading nation in 
development assistance into a political tool. It is evident that the discourse is one that 
brings the UK pride and underlines their strong position in the international 
community. Further, by linking the discourse of the UK being a leading nation with 
the previous failures of Conservative Party she creates cohesion with the audience as 
the speech is given at her own parties conference. 
 
This speech includes, moreover, a small briefing on the relationship with Rwanda in 
the context of her explanation of the importance of the UK’s strategy towards 
countries in conflict. As mentioned before, there is on one side an acknowledgement 
of the terrible role of the international community in the genocide. On the other side, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Named “Britain’s aid biggest scandal”, it was an agreement made between Margaret Thatcher’s 
government and the Malaysian government to build a dam, which at that time was declared 
uneconomic by official in Britain and Malaysia. In that occasion £238m in UK aid were tied to a major 
arms deal. In late 1994, aid for the project was declared unlawful in a landmark case at the UK high 
court. It led to the annulation of the tied aid, and the creation of the DFID with a cabinet minister (that 
can stand in a stronger position in front of a decision of the Prime Minister. When a permanent 
secretary dissents from a spending proposal, parliament is immediately notified). (Provost, 2012) 
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Rwanda is an example of those countries that need support in order to avoid the 
division and poverty that lead to fighting: “It is for this reason that the UK has over 
the past 3 years taken on the leading international role in helping Rwanda to 
establish justice and development in that small tortured country”.  (Short, 2000)  
Hereby, Short creates the foundation for the discourse of the UK as a leading nation 
not only in development assistance in general but especially in the case of Rwanda. 
This is done by underlining the UK has used their ‘leading international role’ to help 
Rwanda. With this she clearly uses the colonial discourse and ideology to define the 
power relation not only between the UK and the international community, but also 
establishing the UK as the helping hand Rwanda needs. 
On that occasion Clare Short announced the financial budgetary commitment to 
Rwanda to restore services, and among them the universal primary education “to give 
opportunities to a whole generation of Rwandan children”. It is therefore important to 
create public-private partnerships that can provide knowledge and money, given the 
tight of the budgetary situation of these countries  (Short, 2000). By making reference 
to children she uses coherence to create an emotional connection with the audience, 
thereby making them more inclined to follow her arguments. In this case, it is the 
British under the guidance of the Labour Party that can take on such a valuable 
commitment, thereby creating the foundation for the colonial discourse. 
 
This is part of the development strategy of the UK, which is defined by her as mostly 
“long-term development, the resolving of conflict (…) an investment in development 
and self reliance rather than dependency and handouts”.  (Short, 2000) 
This remark is important, as a typical criticism of the aid system is the dependency 
and paternalism created by the donor-aided relationship. 
 
In this speech (which is highly political and addressing ‘the Conference’) she recounts 
points of success and challenges ahead of the government, though mostly to them as a 
party in charge of the government.  
The speech aims to be an encouragement for the members of the Labour Party to 
secure next elections, because on that depends the continuation of this development 
policy, which is one to be proud of. “The Labour Party has a major role to play in 
this. We must all work to ensure that we win the next election to ensure that we fully 
play our part.”  (Short, 2000) 
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Rwanda Country Assistance Plan 2003-2006 
The Country Assistance Plans sets out DFIDs aim to assist Rwanda in achieving its 
own Poverty Reduction Strategy, based on the 1997 and 2000 White Papers and as a 
commitment to the MDGs. 
The Paper starts with a balance between the difficult challenges lying ahead of 
Rwanda and the accomplishments of its government. The long-term strategies of 
development created by the Rwandan Government (‘Vision 2020’ and its ‘Poverty 
Reduction Strategy’) are welcomed in this DFID’s document.  
 
The document acknowledges that changes happened in Rwanda in matters of 
democracy and government policy, as they claim that there is now an increased public 
participation. They base this argument on the process of the creation of the new 
constitution and in the plans for decentralization. However, it is also recognized that 
there is a need of creating an “environment which supports free expression”, as a fact 
that is seen as a key challenge for the implementation of the present Country 
Assistance Plan  (DFID, 2004, p. 2).  
 
Another positive assessment of Rwanda’s government made in this report says “the 
country does not seem to be blighted by corruption. It is certainly not an endemic 
problem, as it is in neighbouring countries”. They base this claim on the fact that “a 
number” public institutions “have taken a strong public stance against corruption 
and adopted anti-corruption policies”, furthermore, a ”code of conduct for the public 
service will shortly be put in place” (DFID, 2004, pp. 9-10). Although democracy is 
not explicitly mentioned, it is obviously linked to the western understanding of liberal 
democracy. The quote it is clear that the DFID is satisfied with the performance of the 
Rwandan government when fighting corruption. Interestingly, this accomplishment is 
not being explicitly linked to democratic development. It seems as if the colonial 
discourse of spreading liberal democracy is not being underlined here, maybe because 
the discourse cannot be supported by the facts taking place in Rwanda at the time. 
Corruption is a widely acknowledged problem in African countries (and often 
surrounding the misuse of aid). Here the underpinning of the fact that the Rwandan 
government appears to be determined to fight corruption seems to support further 
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engagement from DFIDs side.  
 
The DFID believes that in order to implement this program “the further alignment of 
the budget to strategic priorities” is imperative, among other necessary actions  
(DFID, 2004, p. 2). Here it is interesting to notice the vocabulary used, specifically 
‘alignment’ and ‘harmonisation’ appear in this paper, as they are only present once in 
two other papers from the DFID. The vocabulary later becomes important in 
documents such as the Paris Declaration of 2005. It is therefore matching with the 
current trends in the discourse utilized in the development dialogue in the 
international level. 
Accordingly the DFID wants to “promote aid co-ordination, harmonisation, and 
alignment” (DFID, 2004, pp. 2-3) As the DFID is the co-chair of Harmonisation and 
Alignment Working Group for Rwanda their “will work with Government and other 
current and potential providers of budgetary support to produce a harmonised 
framework for budgetary support, and explore opportunities for harmonizing 
projectised assistance”.  
Interactions with the other members of the group as well as others who are not 
members to “support lesson-learning between Rwandan development partners and 
other developing countries” is one of the objectives  (DFID, 2004, p. 3). The use 
grammar to for the word ‘lesson-learning’ suggests that one of the gains that the 
DFID as an office that prioritises research gets from the presence in Rwanda is the 
acquisition of knowledge that can be utilised for solving problems in poor countries. 
It can also be seen to support the discourse of the UK being a leading nation in 
development assistance. As the lessons learned from the case of Rwanda can provide 
the DFID with important knowledge on their next endeavour in the developing world. 
 
The DFID believes that together with the Government of Rwanda they meaningfully 
“embark on a long-term initiative to enable Rwanda citizens to progressively realize 
their human rights“ (DFID, 2004, p. 3). This does not mean that DFID does not 
acknowledge the problem of human rights, as they recognise that the government is 
being “subject to criticism over alleged abuses of human rights” (DFID, 2004, p. 4) 
prior to the national elections of 2003, as well as the constrains to freedom of 
expression, and the pace of the democratic reform. On this occasion the UK did not 
suspend aid as other donors did. 
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Since then, only one situation has triggered the suspension of the DFID’s support to 
Rwanda, this was the supposedly involvement of Rwanda in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo10 in November 2012.11 
 
The criticism for the situation of human rights and democracy is certainly being 
acknowledged by the UK. DFID further encourages the Rwandan Government itself 
to take care of the situation of the allegations of human rights abuses “investigate, 
publish the findings and take action against the responsible” (DFID, 2004, p. 6). By 
proposing that the government of Rwanda should ‘investigate’, ‘publish’ and ‘take 
action’, DFID almost makes it seem like they are talking to a fully democratic state. 
These are actions that would be expected of a democracy to perform when accused of 
human rights violations. Although by the lack of including democracy in this context 
makes it clear that DFID knows that Rwanda is not there yet. When having that 
knowledge it seems curious to recommend putting such an investigation in the hands 
of the Government of Rwanda that would then leave them with the responsibility for 
investigating their own faults.  
 
A remarkable point of this paper is the fact that the DFID suggests that there is not in 
the best interest of Rwanda to become democratic and improving the political 
conditions and freedom of speech immediately.  
 
“In opening up space for legitimate political debate, the Government will 
need to balance its own and its citizens’ aspirations with the reality of 
continuing political and social fragility and the risk that moving too quickly 
could allow a genocide ideology to re-establish itself.”  (DFID, 2004, p. 2).  
 
The fact that the DFID (although they claim that a better political environment is 
desired) supports Kagame, in this matter suggests that the DFID’s focus shifts away 
from the colonial discourse of spreading liberal democracy. The discourse that the 
DFID is forming instead is one where a trade-off between immediate economic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 In that occasion, a UN Group of Experts report that Rwandan senior military officials were directly 
supporting M23 rebels fighting the Congolese government in the east of the mineral rich country.!
11 Later on, in March 2013 the UK decided to restore the aid to Rwanda in the form of general budget 
support, but with some changes. Part of that aid (16 million pounds) would go through programs 
instead of GBS.!
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development and democracy. 
 
In regards with the approach of the government of Rwanda towards democracy, the 
DFID believes that they have to opening up space for political debate cautiously. 
DFID states that opening up for political debate in different areas: “whether through 
empowered political opposition, the independent media, or civil society” (DFID, 
2004, p. 5). And understand that at the moment it is not happening because people in 
charge of the government of Rwanda“ feel that, given the fragility of the country in 
these the early stages of reconstruction and state building, the opening up of any 
political space presents an unacceptable risk and jeopardizes progress already 
made”. (DFID, 2004, p. 6) 
 This seems to reveal a continuation of the discourse found above. Through its 
understanding of the lack of fully developed democracy DFID seems to make use of a 
trade-off discourse where economic development is being put before the existence of 
a democratic environment and a space of freedom of expression. DFID uses both 
force and cohesion to imprint the reader with the reasoning for this trade-off. Force 
can be seen in the use of ‘fragility’, ‘early stage of reconstruction’, ‘state-building’, 
‘unacceptable risk’ and ‘jeopardizes progress’. By the use of this specific vocabulary 
in one sentence it makes Rwanda seem like a country in a constant state of despair 
that has been going on since the genocide in 1994. Rwanda is a developing country 
and therefore the impression the reader is left with is partly correct, but by not 
expanding on the ‘progress already made’ the reader is left with only the made side of 
thing. This is indirect force being used to establish the reader’s opinion by the use of 
cohesion. 
 
In this way the UK is to a great extent justifying the censorship to expressions on 
ethnicity carried by Rwandan government on the basis of ‘fear of return to the past’  
(DFID, 2004, p. 6). This can clash also with the commitment to respect cultural rights, 
freedom of speech and right to democracy, as political opposition has been punished 
for speaking out. And the UK may be indirectly contributing to this situation by 
supporting this regime: The DFID recognises that the “progressive champions of 
change” that have led Rwanda’s road to improvement are a small group of 
individuals, and that is an obstacle to a sustainable progress that needs the long term 
execution of the policies envisioned in this period. “Sustained progress, driven as it is 
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by some key individuals, can only be assured if the positive vision they carry can be 
more fully embedded in the longer term”. However, despite the fact that Rwanda is 
heavily criticized for the lack of an environment that allows the birth of political 
forces, the DFID “will support those policies and individuals which champion the 
Government’s commitment to delivering real improvements in basic services and to 
building a democratic and inclusive state”. (DFID, 2004, p. 6) Here the use of 
‘individuals’ connected with ‘the Government’s commitment’ is interesting, as DFID 
does not mention the Rwandan president by name. This could show a future shift 
from the trade-off discourse and insinuate that the colonial discourse of spreading 
democracy is still alive and well. 
 
So as the DFID acknowledges the criticism but they appear to be understanding with 
the reasons that the government of Rwanda gives for not opening up for democracy 
faster or improve the situation of human rights, saying “Whilst we believe that the 
Government remains committed to progressively securing all human rights for its 
people, we share the concerns of the international community over alleged abuses of 
human rights”.  (DFID, 2004, p. 8) 
The monitoring plan and the new offices are intentioned to “facilitate clear links 
between planning and the allocation of resources; and promote greater national 
ownership of national poverty reduction goals”. (DFID, 2004, p. 9).  
Here they introduce the term “ownership”, which seems to be an increasingly relevant 
term at that moment, as it is also the main pillar of the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness of 2005. 
Furthermore, the document states that the Government intends with the designed 
sector strategies to create the “basis for donor co-ordination, harmonisation and 
alignment”  (DFID, 2004, p. 10), which increasingly became important notions in 
development, as seen in the Paris Declaration. Although it is recognises that there has 
not been great advance on the harmonisation agenda, blamed on the fact that Rwanda 
does not have a long history of receiving aid, that came often from uncommitted 
donors.. (DFID, 2004, p. 10) Once again, the DFID reaffirms their role as a more 
committed donor in comparison to others. “But the situation is changing”, the DFID 
claims, as the Poverty Reduction Strategy and its implementation mechanisms and the 
fact that the government is taking an active role in directing donor activity “will 
provide the foundation for co-ordination and harmonization”  (DFID, 2004, p. 10).  
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The main partnership in Rwanda is given with the government, but the DFID claims 
to be interested in developing a closer relationship with organizations outside of 
government. Ambiguously, they support the Strategy of the Rwandan government 
that enhances the role of the government rather than that of the organisations of the 
civil society: They claim they aim to promote government accountability and more 
effective dialogue between government and civil society and in this way, “providing 
checks and counterweights to authoritarian governance, creating incentives for 
reform and enabling greater plurality in decision-making”. (DFID, 2004, p. 15)  
This is one of the weakest sides of the Rwanda government as it is widely criticized 
for the lack of space for NGOs and civil society to participate, but does not seem 
enough for the DFID to discourage support. Backing of the strong leadership of 
Kagame and his government does not seem to be abridged by this issue. The British 
government through DFID “believe that we can make the greatest impact on poverty 
by working predominately through government” (DFID, 2004, p. 15) therefore, there 
is a promotion of the Poverty Reduction Strategy. This certainly enhances the role of 
the government, which “remains committed to poverty reduction, to macro-economic 
stability and to social inclusion” and the way to achieve this is through government 
structures  (DFID, 2004, p. 15)”.  
 
The allegations of human rights violations, the reduced space for political debate and 
the exploitation of resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo can trigger the 
disengagement of the international community  (DFID, 2004, p. 2). This is very 
dangerous because, as Rwanda is highly dependent on external help, the withdrawal 
for foreign assistance would be devastating for the economy. On this issue, DFID 
takes a strong position in calling the international community to “take action only on 
the basis of hard evidence, not on rumour and speculation” and therefore the DFID 
has “urged the Government to investigate all allegations of human rights abuses and 
illegal exploitation of natural resources, publish the findings, and take action against 
those responsible”. According to the DFID it is in the hands of the Government of 
Rwanda to clarify and solve this inconveniences if they existed  (DFID, 2004, p. 12).  
 
In addition, they believe that the process of decentralisation carried by the 
Government of Rwanda is important, and the progressive reconciliation and 
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democratisation plan is ambitious, and although it is a high-risk political agenda, they 
believe that “there is real commitment to fostering change and that we should seek to 
support fully those who are promoting it”.  (DFID, 2004, p. 12). Finally, their assess 
is that “the level of risk, already high, is increasing as Rwanda completes the 
transition period and moves to establish a new Government”. This final statement 
clear all doubts that the support given by the DFID to the government of Kagame may 
not be interrupted because of the weaknesses in the democratic system and lack of 
freedom of speech. Kegames leadership is seen as capable to overcome the problems 
marked by internal divisions, and his development strategy seems to be in line with 
the trade-off discourse. So the discourse of a trade-off between democracy and human 
rights on one side, and effective promotion of economic growth seem to present in the 
text, and the DFID clearly prioritises the economic growth. 
&
& &
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Conclusion&
In this project we have answered the following research question; 
 
In what way do the discourses of DFIDs general policy and the local policy 
towards Rwanda show a consistency or lack thereof between general and 
country level discourses? 
 
Through our analysis we have found several discourses present in both DFIDs general 
policy and their policy towards Rwanda. The uses of individual discourses have been 
shown to fluctuate over time as new ones replace some of them. Even more 
interesting, we have found that the discourses present in the general policy at one 
point in time, can be non existing or not relevant in the local policy towards Rwanda. 
Hereby are the main findings of the analysis of the discourse presented by topic:  
 
Morality discourse 
The morality discourse was found to be evident in the 1997 White Paper and got 
further established in DFIDs general policy in the 2006. Moreover, in 2009 the 
morality discourse seems to be put in the background, as other discourses are more 
relevant. The interesting thing is that the morality discourse only appears in the local 
policy towards Rwanda in Clare Short’s speech from 2000. 
The interesting of this finding is the fact that the discourse of morality is so slight in 
the local policy towards Rwanda, while on the contrary it is so evident in the general 
policy. The morality discourse is not another way of declaring DFID as a moral 
institution; rather it is a discourse DFID uses to maintain the importance of their own 
work and justifying their actions. This stands in vast contrast with the UKs actions or 
lack thereof when the genocide was a reality in Rwanda. 
On that occasion, the UK had not acted correctly (understood in moral terms): the 
British discourse (Tony Blair’s for example) tells that the country failed to act or 
alternatively, they were not aware of the dimension of the problem in Rwanda. 
Accounts of facts tell that the British government refused to act and prevented the 
international community to do so by their actions in the UNSC.  
Further, DFID uses the morality discourse to justify to the citizens of the UK why it is 
important to use money on development aboard even in a time of economic crisis. It 
is possible to believe that given the difficult economic situation at that time, the DFID 
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gives account to the British citizens of the benefits obtained by allocating their money 
in countries where the local problems have a repercussion in other parts of the world, 
namely the UK.  
 
Value for money and development as security discourses 
The discourses that overpower the morality discourse are a value for money and 
security as a mean to development. The discourse of value for money is being 
established in 2009 and doesn’t appear in the other White Papers, but the 
development as security discourse is also seen in 2006. Whereas neither discourses 
are ever evident in the local policy towards Rwanda. 
It is interesting to see that that the value for money discourse becomes evident at the 
same time as the global economic crisis was a reality. More so, the discourse is only 
present in the general policy and not evident or used in the local policy towards 
Rwanda.  
The discourse of development as a way of creating security helps to underline the 
value for money discourse further, as the paper reflects how the British citizens can 
benefit from the actions taken by the DFID abroad: eliminating poverty and creating 
development creates stability and security. In an interconnected world, problems that 
occur in one country can affect others: therefore it will be key to maintain regional 
stability in the area of Rwanda in order protect UK interest in surrounding countries 
and at home.  
 
Leading nation discourse 
In the White Paper from 2000 a discourse of the UK as a leading nation in 
development assistance becomes evident, and it continues to be present in both 2006 
and 2009. In the local policy towards Rwanda the discourse is clearly evident in both 
Clare Shorts speech from 2000 and in 2004, but doesn’t seems to be supported in the 
earlier 1999 document.  
The leading nation discourse is used as a way for DFID to establish that they are the 
institution doing good in poor countries and consequently to their own country, they 
are leaders within the system (vis-á-vis other institutions) and also in the field of 
development in general. Therefore, considering the interest of the DFID in research 
and experience, the complexity of the reality of Rwanda also represents a formidable 
case study from which to learn, create policy and spread their knowledge.  
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The UK uses their involvement in post-genocide Rwanda to establish the discourse. 
Restoring a devastated country such as Rwanda can provide the desired image of 
success and effectiveness as a donor, prestige in the international community, which 
is increased by the fact that it has been committed from the beginning, when other 
donor countries where not engaging as much as they did.  
This is also evident when DFID adopts an attitude of superiority over international 
organizations and underline their discourse or being a leading nation by criticising 
them. 
 
Colonial discourse 
The colonial discourse of spreading democracy is very pronounced in the 2006 white 
paper, and only seems to be present in after in 2009 and not before in 1997 and 2000. 
Whereas we found the colonial discourse to be evident in both 1999 and 2000, but 
doesn’t show prominently in 2004. 
It is interesting to see the colonial discourse is prominent in in the local policy 
towards Rwanda in 2000 and the years before, whereas the discourse first becomes 
evident in the 2006 and 2009 white papers. The lacking results on democratic 
development in Rwanda must be the reason for DFIDs lack of continued use of the 
colonial discourse in the local policy. The discourse is simply being contradicted on a 
daily basis and therefore has no standing in direct connection to Rwanda.  
Interestingly enough the lack of result in Rwanda does not seem to hold the discourse 
back in the general policy. In the general policy the colonial discourse of the UK 
bringing democracy to the world through their development assistance is alive and 
well and is being further underlined by the establishment of the leading nation 
discourse. 
 
Trade-off discourse 
In the local policy towards Rwanda we found a trade of discourse that entails a trade 
off between immediate economic development and democratic development in 
Rwanda. Further it seemed as if the colonial discourse was being replaces by the 
trade-off discourse. The trade-off discourse was only evident in 2004 and may be 
explained by the lack of results of democratic development in Rwanda. The trade-off 
discourse is at no point present in the general policy of DFID. 
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Although there is a lack of democratic development in Rwanda, Kagame’s role in 
delivering development in other key areas such as economic growth and anti-
corruption is being praised by DIFD. 
This shows that DFID prioritise Rwanda’s performance in other areas than democracy 
and freedom of speech, this is incompatible with the colonial discourse of speeding 
liberal democracy that is evident in the general policy. Therefore the trade-off 
discourse in the local policy towards Rwanda stand in vast contrast to the colonial 
discourse in the general policy of the same period. 
In the case of Rwanda seems that the DFID choose to focuses on the results obtained 
by Kagame’s governance rather than the development of democracy, thereby 
establishing a trade-off discourse in their policy towards Rwanda. 
 
The conclusions that we have reached through the critical discourse analysis places 
this project firmly within the field of discourse research previously done on the UKs 
development policies and the DFID. We have found evidence of a morality discourse 
that correlates with the findings of Zoë Marriage (2006), a discourse of development 
as security consistent with the findings of Leni Wild and Samir Elhawary (2012) and 
a colonial discourse that is in accordance with the findings of April R. Biccum.   
Further we can contribute to the field with the discovery of a leading nation discourse 
that is most evident in the general policy, a value for money discourse in the general 
policy that becomes evident in the years after the global economic crisis and lastly 
and most noticeably a trade-off discourse that seems to be limited to DFIDs local 
policy towards Rwanda.!
( !
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Annex&!Table! 1! Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for 21st Century (1997) (Total 
words in document = 26518)!
 
 Rank Word Frequency         % 
1 1 Developmental/development/developing 558 2,10 
2 2 Country/counties 331 1,25 
3 3 Poor/poorer/poorest 176 0,66 
4 4 International/internationally 170 0,64 
5 5 Support/supporting/supported 137 0,52 
6 6 Policy/Policies 128 0,48 
7 7 Government/governments/governmental 123 0,46 
8 8 Poverty 122 0,46 
9 9 People 117 0,44 
10 10 Partner/partners/partnership 107 0,40 
11 11 Work 104 2,10 
12 12 Sustainable/sustainability 95 0,36 
13 13 Economic/economies 88 0,33 
14 14 Resource/resources 78 0,29 
15 15 Human/Humanitarian 73 0,28 
16 15 Eliminate/eliminating/elimination 73 0,28 
17 16 Help/helping 71 0,27 
18 17 Assistance 69 0,26 
19 18 UK/UK's 65 0,25 
20 19 Right/rights 59 0,22 
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Table!2!Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor (2000) 
(Total words in document = 39787)!
 
 Rank Word Frequency          % 
1 1 Develop/developed/developing/development 736 1,85 
2 2 Country/countries 632 1,59 
3 3 International/internationally 255 0,64 
4 4 Global/globalisation 249 0,63 
5 5 Poor/poorest 234 0,59 
6 6 Government/governments/governmental 202 0,51 
7 7 UK/UK's 190 0,48 
8 8 Poverty 179 0,45 
9 8 Work 179 0,45 
10 9 World/worlds 175 0,44 
11 10 People 172 0,43 
12 11 Policies/policy 171 0,43 
13 12 Trade 165 0,41 
14 13 Effective/effectiveness/effect 151 0,38 
15 14 Environmental/environmentally/environment 136 0,34 
16 15 Financial/finance 125 0,31 
17 16 Investment/investments 120 0,30 
18 17 Support/supported/supporting 109 0,27 
19 17 Assistance/assist 109 0,27 
20 18 Economic/economies 100 0,25 
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Table!3!Eliminating World Poverty – making governance work for the poor (2006) 
(Total words in document = 40540)!
 
 Rank Word Frequency          % 
1 1 Developing/development/developed 518 1,28 
2 2 Country/counties 453 1,12 
3 3 International/internationally 307 0,76 
4 4 UK/UK's/ United kingdom 218 0,54 
5 5 People 209 0,52 
6 6 Support/supporting/supported 183 0,45 
7 7 Africa/African 183 0,45 
8 7 Change 171 0,42 
9 8 Aid 160 0,39 
10 9 Poor/poorest 158 0,39 
11 10 Help 152 0,37 
12 11 World 146 0,36 
13 11 Poverty 146 0,36 
14 12 Service/services 130 0,32 
15 12 UN/United Nations 130 0,32 
16 13 Climate 124 0,30 
17 14 Growth 115 0,28 
18 15 Governance 113 0,28 
19 15 Partner/partners/partnership 113 0,28 
20 16 Public 103 0,25 
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Table! 4! Eliminating World Poverty: Building our Common Future (2009) (Total 
words in document = 49363)!
 
 Ran
k Word Frequency         % 
1 1 Country/countries 520 1,05 
2 2 Develop/development/developing 502 1,02 
3 3 UK/UK's/United Kingdom 394 0,80 
4 4 World 321 0,65 
5 5 Support/supporting/supported 316 0,64 
6 6 Work/works/working/worked 299 0,61 
7 7 International/internationally 249 0,50 
8 8 Help/helps/helping/helped 215 0,44 
9 8 Climate 215 0,44 
10 9 Change 207 0,42 
11 10 Poverty 205 0,42 
12 11 Global 182 0,37 
13 12 People 180 0,36 
14 13 Poor/poorest 174 0,35 
15 14 Growth 158 0,32 
16 15 Government/governments 154 0,31 
17 16 UN 140 0,28 
18 17 Aid 134 0,27 
19 18 DFID 131 0,27 
20 19 Conflict 119 0,24 
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Table! 5! Rwanda Country Strategy Paper 1999 -2002 (1999) (Total words in 
document 8064)!
 
 Rank Word Frequency          % 
1 1 Rwanda/Rwanda’s/Rwandan/Rwandan 124 1,54 
2 2 Government/governments 110 1,36 
3 3 Develop/development/developmental 99 1,23 
4 4 Support/supporting 53 0,66 
5 5 Economic/economy 46 0,57 
6 6 Commit/committed/commitment/commitments 40 0,50 
7 7 Programme/programmes 38 0,47 
8 7 International/internationally 38 0,47 
9 8 United Kingdom/UK/UKs 35 0,43 
10 9 Expenditure 33 0,41 
11 9 Social 32 0,40 
12 10 Donor/donors 32 0,40 
13 11 Poverty 31 0,38 
14 12 Budget/budgetary 29 0,36 
15 12 Department for International Development/DFID 27 0,33 
16 12 Partnership/partnerships 27 0,33 
17 13 Sector/sectorial/sectors 26 0,32 
18 14 National 25 0,31 
19 15 Work/works/working 24 0,30 
20 15 Resource/resources 24 0,30 
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Table!6!Speech by Clare Short to the Labour Party Conference (2000) (Total words in 
document = 1783)!
 
 Rank Word Frequency          % 
1 1 Developing/development 20 1,12 
2 2 Poverty 16 0,90 
3 2 World/worlds 16 0,90 
4 3 International 15 0,84 
5 4 Country/countries 14 0,79 
6 5 People 11 0,62 
7 5 Commit/commitment/committed 11 0,62 
8 6 Government/governments 10 0,56 
9 7 System/systematic 8 0,45 
10 7 Support/supported 8 0,45 
11 7 Conflict 8 0,45 
12 7 Work/worked/working 8 0,45 
13 8 Budget/budgetary 7 0,39 
14 8 Rwanda 7 0,39 
15 9 Need 6 0,34 
16 9 Debt 6 0,34 
17 9 Relief 6 0,34 
18 10 Education 5 0,28 
19 10 Wealth 5 0,28 
20 10 Reduction 5 0,28 
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Table! 7! Rwanda Country Assistance Plan 2003-2006 (2004) (Total words in 
document = 10997)!
 Rank Word Frequency      % 
1 1 Government/governments 199 1,81 
2 2 Rwanda/Rwandan/Rwanda’s/Rwandans 114 1,04 
3 3 Support/supported/supporting 84 0,76 
4 4 Develop/development/developed 77 0,70 
5 5 Poverty reduction strategy/PRS 67 0,61 
6 6 Poverty 59 0,54 
7 7 Strategy/strategies 55 0,50 
8 8 Department for International development/DFID 52 0,47 
9 9 Economic/economy 43 0,39 
10 10 Political 40 0,36 
11 11 Budget/budgetary 39 0,35 
12 12 UK 38 0,35 
13 13 Sector/sectorial/sectors 35 0,32 
14 14 Policy 31 0,28 
15 14 Management 31 0,28 
16 15 National 30 0,27 
17 16 Rural 29 0,26 
18 16 Social 29 0,26 
19 16 Donor/donors 29 0,26 
20 16 Work/working 29 0,26 
 
 !!
